Iranian President Seyyed Ebrahim Raisi’s three-day visit to Pakistan from April 22 to 24 has been hailed by Pakistan as an important diplomatic milestone. The visit will be the first by a foreign leader to Pakistan since the hotly contested Feb. 8 election, which was marked by accusations of cheating and irregularities, but it is also the first by a foreign leader to visit Pakistan since the highly contested February 8 election, which was marked by accusations of cheating and cheating. It has taken on even more importance against the backdrop of rising tensions. Meanwhile, Tehran and Islamabad further strengthened their international presence in January 2024 through a strategically staged military display (largely seen as a ploy to satisfy domestic political aims). did.
For both countries, this visit marks an important moment as they navigate a labyrinth of significant internal and external pressures. For Pakistan, especially its military top brass, the event is a strategic gamble to balance traditional allies like the Gulf states and the United States, and seek to shore up financial perks. It’s a tactic honed over ten years. The arrival of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi as the country’s first foreign leader after a contentious election underscores Islamabad’s growing geopolitical isolation and declining influence even within its region.
Pakistan is beset by unrelenting challenges. The economy is collapsing, security is irreparably compromised, and foreign policy, especially regarding Afghanistan, is falling apart. The country’s economy is gasping for air, clinging desperately to intermittent foreign aid. In March 2024, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) disbursed its latest installment loan, averting an impending balance of payments crisis for Islamabad. External debt has reached a staggering $131 billion, and Islamabad spends nearly three-quarters of its government revenue on servicing this mountain of debt each year.
Similarly, Islamabad’s Afghanistan policy collapsed just two years after helping the Afghan Taliban establish power in Kabul. The operation was once hailed by many in Pakistan as a regional policy victory. The subsequent deterioration in relations between Islamabad and Kabul highlights the flawed and absurd assumption that colluding with guerrilla groups to replace the existing republican government and shatter the state apparatus will yield long-term benefits. . This apparent failure speaks volumes about the effects of a flawed strategy.
For Iran, which has long been branded an international outcast largely due to its controversial nuclear program and Middle East policies, the visit comes amid rising tensions with Israel and the United States, strengthening regional alliances. It is an opportunity to strengthen, or at least strengthen, and assert its influence. . Moreover, the Iranian government has carried out its most daring military operation in the volatile Middle East by carrying out a widely publicized direct military attack against its regional arch-enemy, Israel. This response came in the wake of Tel Aviv’s airstrike on the Iranian consulate in Damascus, which resulted in the death of several senior Iranian Revolutionary Guards commanders, including Mohamed Reza Zahedi and Mohammad Hadi Hadji Rahimi. died. Iran is considering securing a visit to Pakistan at a time when Israel is urgently seeking to escalate the conflict from Gaza to a wider arena. Pakistan is a country that is viewed through the lens of US influence, as it plays a pivotal role in the US-led war on terror. As a strategic advantage.
Pakistan’s alignment within the Western sphere of influence precluded the possibility of a mutually beneficial relationship with Iran and created mutual mistrust as both countries viewed each other through this ideological lens. This alienation is also evident in their disastrous economic interactions. For example, bilateral trade between Iran and Pakistan in 2022 was just under $800 million. This is an embarrassingly low number considering the economic potential. This harsh reality likely inspired the Iranian president during his visit to pledge to expand Iran-Pakistan trade to $10 billion within the next five years.
Reflecting on the unsatisfactory state of economic relations between the two countries, President Raisi said in a joint press conference with Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif on April 22, “The amount of economic trade between Iran and Pakistan is completely unacceptable.” he declared. As a first step, we have decided to increase the trade volume between our countries to $10 billion. ”
But Islamabad’s long history of bowing to pressure from the United States and Gulf monarchies to distance itself from Iran casts serious doubt on the achievability of this modest goal. Absent such pressure, Pakistan, like the UAE’s Dubai emirate, would use international sanctions against Iran to its benefit, acting as an influencer on Iran’s international economic transactions rather than as an ally of the United States in containing Iran. They could have positioned themselves as a gateway. Such a mutually beneficial relationship could have significantly alleviated the real economic hardships faced by both countries, such as inflation, unemployment, and currency devaluation.
Pakistan’s incompetence is highlighted by Islamabad’s failure to convince the US to greenlight its involvement in the project and to complete part of the Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline. Notably, the Iranian government fulfilled its promise by extending the Asaroe-Iranshahr pipeline to the Pakistan border. What could be more indicative of Pakistan’s predicament than the dire situation created by a military-led regime that must seek recognition from its American patrons in order to pursue its national interests? Despite Pakistani leaders’ frequent public declarations of the project’s launch, questions remain about whether Pakistan’s establishment is ready to rebel against American rule and work more closely with Iran. There is skepticism and it is highly unlikely that the project will materialize in the near future.
Furthermore, deep-rooted mutual distrust plagues relations, with both countries accusing the other of harboring terrorist forces that launch attacks on their territory. For example, the Iranian government has repeatedly said that Pakistan provides shelter to anti-Iranian Sunni extremist groups such as Jaish al-Adl, which has launched numerous attacks in Iran’s Balochistan and Sistan provinces. I’ve been criticizing. This was cited as a justification for an airstrike by Iran in Panjgur, Pakistan’s Balochistan province, on January 16. Similarly, Islamabad suspects Iranian support for the Baloch rebels and justified the January 18 missile attack as targeting these groups. However, accusations persist that Iran and Islamabad are using the terror narrative and subsequent military response as a pretext to allow both governments to cater to domestic audiences and avoid external pressure.