The anti-Soviet, anti-communist hysteria that characterized the Cold War era continues to some extent today with the rise of China. This is especially true regarding prevailing sentiments among U.S. strategic circles about Latin America.
For example, U.S. Southern Command Commander Laura Richardson’s testimony before the House and Senate Armed Services Committees in March cited “malicious actors,” “malign influence,” and “malicious The word “malicious” was cited 24 times, including “some effort”. “malicious activity”, “malicious intent”, “malicious narrative”, “malicious act”, “malicious act”, “malicious agenda”.
Often she was referring to actors who appeared to be Chinese, and in some cases Russian actors. This Cold War echo is reminiscent of University of California, San Diego scholar Peter Smith’s discussion of the core of U.S.-Latin American relations. In other words, an important historical factor in American and Latin American politics was the role and activities of the United States. Actors from outside the continent.
According to the 2022 surveyThe RAND Corporation says, “Competition with China is qualitatively and quantitatively different from competition with Russia and Iran in Latin America and the Caribbean.” Moscow and Tehran may be opportunistic and provocative. However, it lacks the qualities that would ensure effective power projection in China. But China has the resources, will, and opportunity to expand and maintain its influence, so it makes sense for the U.S. government to pay close attention to Beijing’s messages, actions, and maneuvers.
Yet the sheer size of America’s own security presence in the region, and how small China’s presence is by comparison, is often not discussed in Washington. These numbers show that the idea that China’s military threat is imminent is overstated and misguided.
Let’s start by examining what is known as the “iron river” of weapons flowing into the region. According to the latest Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) report on arms transfers, the ranking of the largest arms suppliers to South America from 2019 to 2023 is France (23%), the United States (14%), and the UK (12%). During that period, Russia did not supply arms to South America.
An analysis of SIPRI data from 2000 to 2022 by Ryan Berg and Rubi Bledsoe of the Center for Strategic and International Studies found that 94.9% of Argentina’s arms acquisitions, 93.4% of Colombian arms acquisitions; It is shown that 90.7% of acquisitions originate from the United States. 82.7% of those acquired by Mexico and 82.7% of those acquired by Brazil. This means that Latin America’s four largest economies rely on the United States as their main arms supplier.
During the same period, Russia was by far the largest arms supplier to Venezuela, with Caracas’ purchases reaching $4.5 billion. China was the largest supplier (66.2%) of the $77 million in arms purchased by Bolivia. Just last month, President Javier Milley confirmed a commitment by Argentina to purchase 24 F-16s from Denmark, with Washington’s permission.
In terms of geographic presence, the United States maintains a large military presence in the region through the Guantanamo Naval Base in Cuba and the Soto Cano Base in Honduras. US Southern Command is responsible for three “Joint Security Posts” in El Salvador, Aruba, and Curacao. For decades, Southcom has regularly conducted various types of multilateral exercises (such as UNITAS, Tradewinds, PANAMAX, and Southern Cross) and bilateral military exercises (such as Southern Vanguard with Brazil and Relampago with Colombia) on land, sea, and air. Russia occasionally conducts military exercises with Venezuela and Nicaragua. China participated in sniper tests in Venezuela in 2022, and the Chinese government is increasing its offerings of courses and educational programs for Latin American military personnel.
The United States maintains the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, replacing the controversial School of the Americas that trained anti-communist military forces during the Cold War. The Security Force Assistance Brigade was established in 2018 and is distributed across six commands, including U.S. Southern Command, according to a Congressional Research Service report. “The original SFAB maintains a permanent presence in Colombia, Honduras, and Panama, with occasional expansion into Peru,” Ecuador, and Uruguay. ”
The National Guard, which now consists of 18 states, plus Puerto Rico and Washington, D.C., has agreements with 24 Latin American countries. Meanwhile, Washington has designated Argentina (1998), Brazil (2019), and Colombia (2022) as non-NATO allies. Nothing similar happens with China or Russia in Latin America.
China reached an agreement with Argentina during the center-left government of Cristina Fernández (2007-2015) to establish a deep space station in Neuquén province. This arrangement meant the construction of facilities for tracking, command, and data collection facilitated by deep space antennas. The next government of centre-right Mauricio Macri completed construction by 2017 and tilted security ties back towards the US in 2018, securing funding for the Southern Command for the Emergency Operations Coordination Center in Neuquén. . This is part of SOUTHCOM’s humanitarian programs and exercises. In fact, several radar stations throughout Latin America are operated by SOUTHCOM.
Another data point is the security relationship across financial flows. The latest Congressional Research Service report on U.S. aid to the region reveals the extent of Washington’s support for counter-drug efforts in the region over the years. From 2000 to 2022, U.S. aid to Plan Colombia exceeded $13 billion, and from 2008 to 2021, aid to Mexico’s Mérida Initiative reached $3.5 billion.
Total funding for the Caribbean Initiative from 2010 to 2022 was $832 million, and for the Central American Initiative from 2008 to 2020 was $2.9 billion. While not all of that aid is military in nature, security-related funding will amount to 26.6 percent, or $658.3 million, of total U.S. aid to Latin America in 2024. China has never demonstrated a willingness to provide such extensive assistance on security issues, nor has it engaged in supporting counter-narcotics efforts in the region.
You can also see the U.S. regional footprint through its impact on the high seas. In 2020, the U.S. Navy announced that it would change the name of U.S. Fleet Command to Atlantic Fleet to focus more on regional threats. In 2008, the Navy re-established the 4th Fleet with jurisdiction over the Caribbean and Central and South America. Furthermore, three of the last six commanders of Southern Command were from the Navy.
Meanwhile, since 2020, the U.S. Coast Guard has expanded its operations in Central and South America. Washington is accelerating its naval deployment as part of efforts to combat illegal Chinese fishing. Beijing aims to become a naval power with global influence, but its presence in Latin America is limited. The United States’ space denial and anti-access strategy in the maritime domain shows clear signs of strength. If we understand this as a strategy to limit (deny) or prevent (anti-access) enemy forces from advancing into their operational areas, the United States is strengthening its position.
The total U.S. military presence in the region is much more extensive and includes cooperation agreements over ports, aerospace, and inland rivers. No Chinese agreements comparable to these agreements exist. What becomes clear from this portrait is that China appears very cautious about expanding its military reach in Latin America, perhaps because it knows that this could cause tensions with Washington. Instead, it has focused on economic engagement in the region, including trade, investment, and finance, and has been very successful.
Despite Beijing’s involvement in the regional economy, the US government has been sounding the alarm about China’s allegedly nefarious military plans. It is no secret that doing so strengthens Washington’s own military spending justification. In fact, Southcom has requested a nearly 50% budget increase for 2025. In a Latin America with a sky-high homicide rate and a plethora of firearms as the main cause of death, China’s right-sizing of its military presence leaves us with a provocative question: what good is the US doing? Is an arms race with an unrivaled competitor good for the region?
In short, US military superiority in Latin America is undeniable. Indeed, in defense and security matters, Washington has reaffirmed and strengthened its presence in the region. China’s practical projection of economic power has made undeniable progress. However, US superiority in the military sphere has not weakened, nor will it be supplanted.
What is clear is that the notion of an imminent Chinese military threat is overblown and misguided, especially when the US’s substantive projections in the region are less significant and more rhetorical. It means that there is. It is now clear that the United States has surpassed China militarily in Latin America and that China is far from replacing the United States in regional defense and security issues.
