Chinese scientists have devised a new way to overcome the challenges of building on soft coral sand, raising tensions in the contested South China Sea as rival claimants race to build structures for military advantage.
This month, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that scientists at the Ocean University of China have developed a new drilling method that overcomes the limitations of soft coral sand in building artificial islands.
The SCMP notes that China’s three largest artificial islands – Mischief Reef, Fiery Cross Reef and Subi Reef – form a triangular defense position against U.S. military bases in the Philippines.
The report noted that China has transformed seven reefs in the Spratlys into artificial islands using a unique technique that involves harvesting coral from the center of the reefs, crushing it, piling it up, and creating elevated, artificial land to house various facilities.
According to SCMP, a Chinese scientific team led by Chen Xuguang proposed building massive tunnels under each island to strengthen China’s foothold in the region without provoking neighbours.
According to a report by South Carolina’s Morning Star News Agency, the Chinese military and government have mandated that construction activities do not undermine the routine operations or stability of existing above-ground structures due to the fragility of the underlying coral sand layers.
Chen and his colleagues developed an engineering technique that involves injecting a slurry of fine cement particles into the ground through vertical pipes, filling the gaps between the coral sand particles and allowing the cement to harden into a rock-hard underground mass.
SCMP reports that small-scale laboratory tests have confirmed that tunnels can be drilled into the artificial foundation without secondary disasters such as seawater intrusion or ground subsidence.
China’s land reclamations in the South China Sea are an ongoing issue for the United States and the Philippines, as both countries seek appropriate long-term responses.
In an article he contributed to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs in January 2018, Weston Konishi pointed out that the main U.S. strategy against China’s reclamation activities in the South China Sea is the implementation of “Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS).” However, Konishi said it is unclear whether this strategy will actually have an impact on China’s reclamation activities.
Additionally, in a March 2023 Associated Press article, Jim Gomez states that the Philippines has begun a strategy to publicize China’s aggressive actions in the South China Sea. In its latest accusation this month, the Philippines accused China of destroying the disputed reefs of Scarborough Shoal, ruining the livelihoods of its fishermen.
Gomez said the Philippines’ publicity of China’s aggressive actions in the South China Sea is aimed at exposing China’s “grey zone” activities and damaging China’s reputation by forcing it to either admit to its actions or lie about them.
But like U.S. FONOPS, the Philippines’ propaganda strategy against China may have little practical impact on China’s reclamation activities.
In an April 2024 article in Deutsche Welle, David Hutt noted that in recent years, the United States’ European allies, including the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, have increasingly sent warships to the South China Sea.
But those nations are unclear on Philippine claims in the South China Sea, Hatt said, adding that it’s doubtful they have the military power to support the Philippines or influence the outcome of a conflict in the strategic area.
While the Philippines is rapidly modernizing its military on a limited budget and diversifying its defense partnerships to include Japan and Australia, U.S. determination remains a defining factor in the Philippines’ defense posture in the South China Sea.
While U.S. officials have expressed a “firm resolve” toward the Philippines and have stepped up naval exercises and shows of force in the country’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), the U.S. calculations toward the Philippines may not be so favorable for the country.
One indicator is the disparity in US military assistance to key allies and partners. In April 2024, former Philippine Senator Panfilo Lacson noted the huge disparity in US aid to the Philippines and Taiwan.
Lacson said the $500 million was merely a “palliative” to comfort the Philippines against potential collateral damage if the United States were to use the Philippines as a base in case of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. He noted that Taiwan has received $8 billion in military aid from the United States, with a relatively small amount allocated to the Philippines.
From an operational standpoint, the disputed features in the South China Sea have little strategic value to the United States and are militarily indefensible, making it unlikely that China, the biggest beneficiary, would halt freedom of navigation in the area, Quinn Marusik wrote in The National Interest this month.
He said instead of easing tensions between China and the Philippines, the United States was using China’s willingness to use the Philippines as a base in case China invades Taiwan, increasing the risk of escalation.
Marusik added that he doubts the U.S. would risk a nuclear war with China over islands and features in the South China Sea, and that implausible assurances to the Philippines should be replaced with a firm commitment to defend key islands if attacked.
Much to the US’s advantage, and perhaps the disappointment of Filipino experts, the US has remained ambivalent about its commitment to defend the Philippines in the South China Sea.
In a two-part article in Cambridge Core this month, Melissa Roja and Romel Bagares wrote that U.S. interpretations of the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) with the Philippines in 1975 and 1979 denied the country any legal obligation to defend the Philippines in an armed conflict over the Spratly Islands. These legal interpretations, they wrote, were not revised in the 2024 U.S. government statement.
Roja and Bagares said the U.S. was careful to limit its obligations to “armed attacks” against Philippine military and public vessels and aircraft, including those of the coast guard, while within the Philippine EEZ, but not in the disputed Spratly Islands or their respective territorial waters.
They point out that the BRP Sierra Madre, an ageing Philippine warship that ran aground on Second Thomas Shoal, is covered under the 1951 MDT, but the United States has not used military force against China for harassment and attacks on Philippine resupply missions to the beleaguered outpost, although it has blamed China.
While the 1951 MDT claims to cover Philippine installations, forces and vessels on Reed Bank, the 1975 US interpretation excludes the disputed Scarborough Shoal from treaty obligations.
For Roja and Bagares, the question is whether the United States is willing to honor its treaty obligations with the Philippines as U.S. soldiers’ lives fight for tiny features in the South China Sea.
