A new security pact between Russia and North Korea has raised fears around the world about growing ties between Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and its implications for the Korean peninsula, Ukraine and beyond. While some have pointed to last week’s developments as evidence of a strengthening “alliance of evil” that includes Russia, North Korea, China and Iran, in reality the deal could fragment rather than strengthen the growing axis.
As regional tensions rise, history could well repeat itself: China could find itself embroiled in a crisis or full-scale war on the Korean peninsula that it has no desire to fight, and then left to clean up the mess because of Moscow’s preoccupation with Europe, suffering a major setback on its real priorities.
China’s primary goal on the Korean peninsula is to avoid a crisis or chaos, which actually serves the interests of Washington and its allies more than it does Pyongyang or Moscow. Before a crisis occurs, the United States and China, as well as South Korea and other regional stakeholders, should work together to curb Putin-Kim ties and revamp diplomacy on the Korean peninsula.
North Korea Gains Momentum
The newly signed security pact between Russia and North Korea is deliberately vague. Its language states that if either side is thrown into a “state of war” by “armed aggression” by one or more countries, each side will provide “without delay military and other assistance with all means in its possession.” This raises the question of what a “state of war” is and what threshold must be met for the mutual security clause to be triggered. Additionally, the type of assistance either party will provide is left pretty vague, with “military and other assistance” potentially referring to anything from intelligence sharing to sending troops on the ground.
This ambiguity is likely intended to give the United States and its allies uncertainty as to whether the mutual defense clause might be invoked, thus sowing caution. The vague language on the type of assistance also gives Pyongyang and Moscow flexibility regarding their obligations to each other. Moscow and Pyongyang may well have different interpretations and expectations of what they have committed to each other.
However, there are serious concerns that with Russian “security guarantees,” or at least the appearance of them, North Korea may feel emboldened to intensify its provocations, calculating that the United States and its allies will have to take into account Russia’s potential reaction and will respond more cautiously.
Putin unlikely to arrest Kim Jong Un
Of further concern, Moscow has little incentive to prevent its junior partner from engaging in destabilizing actions in Northeast Asia. Indeed, Putin may well welcome a North Korean provocation on the Korean Peninsula that would force the United States to divert its attention from Europe, where Russia is waging a relentless war against Ukraine.
Russia and North Korea would also benefit greatly from a second Trump presidency and may try to stage an “October surprise” to tilt the US presidential election in Trump’s favor. After all, Trump has publicly declared his goodwill toward both Kim Jong Un and Putin. Trump has also hinted at a deal with North Korea that would allow it to retain nuclear weapons and at cutting US aid to Ukraine immediately after the election.
The interests of China, Russia and North Korea are diverging
These developments have unsettled not only the United States and its allies, but also China, which is rapidly losing influence over Pyongyang relative to Moscow, while also paying the diplomatic costs of engaging with the two pariah states.
To be sure, Beijing, Moscow and Pyongyang share a deep dissatisfaction with the US-led world order. All three seek to weaken Washington’s power and influence. But the key difference between Beijing and those two is that Beijing seeks to achieve such an objective without disrupting the world or completely destroying its beneficial relationships with the world’s developed nations.
China needs a stable environment to deal with its many domestic economic challenges, trade tensions and Western de-risking efforts. China wants to move up the technological ladder and accelerate military modernization, which Beijing believes is essential to forcing unification with Taiwan. In contrast, neither Russia nor North Korea has bright economic prospects and sees no benefit from a stable world order, which is why they have always preferred to violently disrupt the status quo.
In private conversations, Chinese observers, like those in South Korea and the United States, have expressed concern about ongoing military technology transfers between Russia and North Korea and their lack of visibility into their short- and long-term impacts. They also share concerns that Putin is encouraging Kim Jong Un to take destabilizing actions to distract from the United States, increasing the risk of war within China.
The last thing Beijing wants is for U.S. attention to shift from Europe to Asia. It is already uncomfortable and resentful of the growing U.S.-South Korean nuclear cooperation, the deepening of trilateral cooperation between the U.S., South Korea and Japan, and the many other steps the Biden administration has taken to strengthen alliance cooperation and deterrence in the region.
Has China been held responsible?
China may end up paying a price for North Korean adventurism, as it did early in the Cold War, when, urged by Moscow, it promoted Communism in Asia and the newly founded People’s Republic of China (PRC) agreed to support the neighboring North Korean regime. Kim Jong-un’s grandfather, Kim Il-sung, was happy to use the backing of the Soviet Union and China to pursue his ambition to annex the entire Korean peninsula. He sparked the first violent conflict of the Cold War, leading to the deaths of an estimated five million civilians and soldiers, including hundreds of thousands of Chinese soldiers.
This was a time when the Chinese Communist Party faced the urgent task of consolidating control at home and rebuilding its war-ravaged economy. Instead, they were forced to turn their attention to the Korean peninsula and spent almost half of the national budget on the military. Mao also missed the opportunity to invade Taiwan, a goal that remains elusive to Beijing today, when the United States sent the Seventh Fleet to neutralize the Taiwan Strait.
To make matters worse, China was counting on Soviet air support and weapons as part of an agreement with Moscow to support North Korea, but Joseph Stalin blurred his promises at a critical moment, and the burden of supporting North Korea fell squarely on Beijing’s shoulders.
The China of that time was different from the China of today, and the balance of power between countries has changed, but Russia and North Korea’s collusion has never worked to China’s advantage.
The Need for U.S.-China Cooperation
The United States, China, South Korea, Japan and nearly every other country in the region seek stability, peace and the ultimate elimination of the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. There are strong cases for cooperation before Russia and North Korea’s cooperation moves the region further away from these goals.
The world is facing conflicts in Europe and the Middle East. The fact that Washington and Beijing cannot cooperate in these conflicts and often have conflicting objectives raises the question of whether we can expect U.S.-China cooperation on the Korean Peninsula.
But the brewing crisis in Northeast Asia is different. Much more is at stake, not just for China’s direct security interests, but also for the interests of the United States and its closest Asian allies. Perhaps most worrying for Beijing, as a direct party to the conflicts it may be able to control the dynamics of escalating tensions in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, but the same cannot be said for Russian-backed North Korean adventurism.
Strengthened US-ROK-Japan military deterrence is necessary but insufficient to address the growing challenge posed by Russian-North Korean cooperation. Clear and credible threats and assurances from the US and China will also be needed to shape Pyongyang and Moscow’s behavior. Cooperation does not mean that all steps must be taken jointly; after all, Washington and Beijing have different ties to and influence over North Korea and Russia. But there is an urgent need for the two sides to quietly discuss how to draw red lines and revamp the dysfunctional diplomatic process of neutralizing the North Korean threat.
