MANILA – The latest skirmish in the South China Sea, in which the Chinese navy forcibly boarded and then disarmed Philippine navy personnel on a resupply mission, has rattled the Philippine government and exposed cracks in the once-united administration of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.
All indications are that the Philippines’ latest Rotational Resupply (RoRe) mission to the disputed Second Thomas Shoal, which houses a de facto Philippine military base on board the stranded BRP Sierra Madre, was not coordinated among the relevant government agencies.
Contradictory statements from the Philippine government after an unprecedented incident that could have easily escalated into armed conflict – when a Philippine soldier lost a thumb in the ensuing melee – have highlighted differences at the highest levels of power over how to deal with increasing Chinese assertiveness in the country’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
As details of the incident began to trickle out after several days of delays, Lucas Bersamin, secretary general of the Philippines’ newly established National Maritime Council, largely dismissed the incident as “probably a misunderstanding or an accident,” while other senior officials used strongly worded condemnations.
But shortly afterward, Philippine Defense Secretary Gilbert Teodoro insisted that the government was not downplaying China’s “aggressive and illegal use of force.” He said what had happened was “[a] The Chinese authorities deliberately [the Philippines] From completion [its] Mission.”
To be sure, political divisions amid geopolitical crises are nothing new for the Philippines, a notoriously tumultuous and contentious democracy.
In 2012, Philippine senators publicly bickered over the country’s diplomatic mismanagement of the Scarborough Shoal crisis, which ultimately led to China’s de facto occupation of land masses in the South China Sea.
Partisan and ideological divisions were also evident during the controversial administration of President Rodrigo Duterte, who openly sought strategic backing from China while sharply criticizing Western allies on historical and human rights issues.
At one point, Duterte was even at odds with political allies within the then-ruling PDP-Laban party, most notably boxing sensation and former senator Manny Pacquiao, who took a tougher stance against China during the 2021 Whitsun Reef crisis.
Marcos Jr. ran in the election on a platform of “unity” and won handily, and succeeded in maintaining consistency within the party in the early stages of his administration.
This is especially true on the foreign policy front, where Philippine leaders have adopted an increasingly assertive stance in the South China Sea that has been well received by both the Filipino public and defense officials.
A leading survey found that more than 90 percent of Philippine voters favor a more aggressive stance, including taking back control of islands claimed by China.
But amid a patriotic surge, entrepreneurial politicians and ambitious bureaucrats who had been largely silent about Duterte’s pro-China policies have begun to flaunt their nationalistic credentials.
In a dramatic change, members of parliament, the senate and other government bodies have begun visiting disputed territories such as Thitu Island to present themselves as patriotic politicians.
Meanwhile, veteran politician Teodoro Jr., a longtime ally of Duterte and who has offered to run alongside Sara Duterte in the 2022 election, has been named head of the Department of National Defense.
He served in the same position during the Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo administration (2001-2010) and had been offered the post multiple times by President Duterte.
Just one year into his previous role, Teodoro Jr. oversaw a rapid and dramatic transformation of the country’s defense policy, including the rapid modernization of the Philippines’ major military installations, the implementation of the Philippines-U.S. Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), joint patrols and large-scale military exercises with like-minded countries, and the introduction of the Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept (CADC) that aims to position the Philippines as a modern and capable maritime nation in the 21st century.st century.
Meanwhile, veteran generals such as former military commander and interior secretary Eduardo Ano have taken over the National Security Council, while former Supreme Court chief justice Lucas Bersamin has been installed as Marcos Jr.’s secretary-general.
Romeo Bronner, a trusted and respected former Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) spokesman, became the military’s commander-in-chief, and rising stars such as Jonathan Malaya and Jay Tarriera have played key roles on the National Security Council and the Philippine Coast Guard, respectively.
In many ways, Marcos Jr. has succeeded in assembling a “dream team” to oversee a South China Sea policy characterized by an aggressive “transparency initiative,” a sophisticated public diplomacy campaign, strong defense diplomacy, and the comprehensive development of maritime security capabilities.
But the Philippines’ new South China Sea strategy is facing an unexpected reality as China has adopted increasingly aggressive “gray zone” tactics to impose its will in the disputed waters after warning it had “reached the limits of its patience.”
First, China has unilaterally imposed new maritime regulations, empowering its coast guard to arrest “foreign trespassers” within the vast nine-dash line area it claims as its sovereign territory across the South China Sea basin.
Tensions reached new heights after Chinese troops swarmed and boarded a Philippine RoRe patrol boat, risking a direct military conflict.
China’s increasing risk tolerance and willingness to leverage its military superiority has exposed the limitations of the Philippines’ current, more assertive strategy, while forcing the Manila government to downplay the incident amid a perceived weakening of U.S. resolve to defend the disputed waters.
The Joe Biden administration, facing a tough re-election campaign and multiple geopolitical conflicts across Eurasia, has shown little interest in providing direct military support in response to China’s non-kinetic use of force that has seriously injured at least one Philippine soldier.
The incident also strengthened long-standing rumors of a rift within the Philippine security establishment between National Security Advisor Anno and Defense Secretary Teodoro Jr.
The latest RoRe mission was not adequately coordinated with other agencies, including those under the National Task Force-West Philippine Sea (NTF-WPS) led by Ano, and reflected the unilateral authority of the defense secretary.
Some critics suggest this is likely due to the political ambitions of Teodoro Jr., who may be considering running for public office in the near future. Others point to genuine differences of opinion among top leaders and the inherent difficulty of standing up to a powerful adversary like China.
Foreign Secretary Teodoro Jr. has repeatedly and publicly questioned the wisdom of diplomatic ties with China, a surprisingly hardline stance that puts him at odds with other cabinet ministers.
“It’s not fruitful. Bilateral talks should take place, but my personal opinion is that only when we have proven it, when we are convinced, when formal bilateral talks should take place when we have proven that we are sincere,” Foreign Secretary Teodoro Jr. said of China in a speech last year.
“It must be based on fundamental principles and good faith and should not be used merely as a weapon to constrain the Philippines,” he added, stressing the need for a results-oriented diplomatic approach.
In contrast, other government officials have insisted on prioritizing engagement, with Secretary-General Bersamin recently arguing that the recent disputes “can be easily resolved” through diplomacy between Manila and Beijing.
Another potential sticking point is the future of the government’s “Transparency Initiative,” which is led by the Philippine Coast Guard in coordination with the National Security Council and has consistently publicized China’s aggressive tactics in disputed waters.
Analysts now wonder whether the Marcos Jr. administration will recalibrate its call-out and condemnation of aggressive Chinese tactics in exchange for new coexistence measures, particularly with regard to resupply missions to disputed areas, particularly Second Thomas Shoal.
Meanwhile, pro-Beijing factions in the Philippines are using the latest incident to pressure the government of President Marcos Jr. to change course, accusing Duterte in particular of needlessly stirring up tensions with China by aligning his successor more closely with U.S. interests.
While asserting Philippine sovereignty over disputed areas, President Duterte claims that his pro-Beijing foreign policy has ultimately succeeded in maintaining a stable element in the South China Sea.
“We had no conflict with China then. We were free to fish in the area. No one interfered with us, there were no territorial disputes,” Duterte said in a recent television appearance, pressing Marcos Jr. to take a more conciliatory stance toward China.
Follow X’s Richard Javad Heydarian at @Richeydarian
