Four years ago, a deadly military crisis on the India-China border sent relations to a new low where they have remained for the most part. In recent months, however, there has been debate in India about the desirability of resetting Sino-Indian relations, whether New Delhi should make a concerted effort to resume political dialogue or resolve differences with Beijing. Such a potential shift is of concern to India’s partners, as it could affect India’s willingness to work with others to balance China.
There are several reasons why the Modi government would like to try to stabilize relations with China or at least lay the foundations for India-China relations: conflict prevention, geopolitical uncertainty, partner negotiations with Beijing, economic impetus, etc. But a tactical thaw is more likely than a structural shift away from Sino-Indian rivalry.
this is, Have The Sino-Indian relationship has already been reset to a more competitive level, and even if it were to somehow be re-strengthened, the relationship would likely remain as it is, as many differences between India and China remain.
A possible tactical thaw
Speculation about a shift in India’s approach was fuelled in April when Prime Minister Narendra Modi said that relations with China were “important and meaningful”. Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh then said India wanted “good relations with all its neighbours”. He also said border talks with Beijing were “progressive and satisfactory” and that “There’s no fresh tension.” Moreover, there was little harsh criticism of China during the election campaign.
China’s new ambassador to India, his first in 18 months, further fueled speculation, as did China’s relatively mild rebuke of Modi’s post-election tweet acknowledging the congratulations of Taiwanese leader William Lai. China also did not publicly criticize India’s hosting of a U.S. congressional delegation that sharply criticized China during the Dalai Lama’s visit to India. Exchanges between think tanks have also increased, and China has touted the ease with which Indians can travel to China.
Both Singh and Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar have denied that India’s stance has changed, but there are several reasons why it would not be surprising if the Modi government, in its third term, were to seek a more stable relationship with China.
First, New Delhi does not want further escalation of tensions on the border where a military standoff has been ongoing for four years. Conflict could hinder India’s economic growth and other objectives, and the outcome would be uncertain given the capabilities gap between China and India.
Second, geopolitical uncertainty: Indian policymakers are already grappling with the impact of several global and regional crises, including the COVID-19 pandemic, the border conflict with China, the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, the Israel-Gaza conflict, and tensions in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait.
These crises will shape New Delhi’s thinking regarding potential escalations with China. These crises have absorbed bandwidth and resources from India and its partners needed to balance Beijing. These partners include the United States, which quickly provided or leased military supplies, intelligence, and diplomatic support to India during the 2020 Sino-Indian crisis.
Meanwhile, the Russia-Ukraine war has disrupted India’s defense imports and led to Russia’s increased reliance on China, which is not ideal for India, which still has a significant amount of Soviet/Russian equipment deployed on its front lines with China. At sea, piracy and Houthi attacks have taken up the attention of the Indian Navy.
The US presidential elections add further uncertainty about the possible reelection of the Trump administration. What may shape Indian thinking is the impact on India’s own options. New Delhi appreciated the Trump administration’s competitive approach towards China. However, there was uncertainty about President Donald Trump’s praise of Xi Jinping. Candidate Trump’s reversal of his TikTok ban policy would have raised similar questions about the consistency of his views on China. India may also assess that Beijing’s own concerns about Trump’s reelection could lead to a tactical rethink by China vis-à-vis India (as it seemed to do in the fall of 2017 when China sought to stabilize its relations with India and Japan).
A third reason why New Delhi might consider selective engagement is concern that recent dialogue and deals by partners with China could make India vulnerable to Chinese pressure. US-China relations are particularly closely watched given historical concerns over the “G2” coalition of Washington and Beijing. A former foreign secretary linked the postponement of the Quad summit earlier this year to Washington’s desire for stability with Beijing. Indians would also have been watching with caution the high-level visits of China to Australia, engagements with European leaders with Xi Jinping and the resumption of China-Japan-Korea talks.
Such interactions will worry India but may also signal to New Delhi that Beijing may be willing to reconsider because China’s main rival is the United States, not India. The Modi government may want to test whether Beijing, facing pressure from Washington and economic headwinds, can ease tensions with India and thwart India’s deepening ties with its Chinese rival.
A fourth reason may be that some in India want to re-establish economic ties with China. The debate within the government between security-first and economic-first camps on this issue is not new. But the assessment that as India seeks to become a manufacturing hub and part of the global supply chain and China Plus One/diversification strategy, certain imports from China are needed is a new element in the debate. Some advocates outside the government are also arguing for loosening import and investment restrictions. Also, some Indian companies are keen to do business with Chinese companies in the areas of telecommunications, retail and electric vehicles.
Finally, some government officials and analysts may be pushing for a rethink of China policy out of skepticism of the United States and concern that India is becoming too close to Washington. They may believe that better relations with China would alleviate the need for alignment with the United States and other Western countries. A more moderate version of this motivation would be that outreach to China would serve as a reminder to India’s Western friends that the Modi government has options and should not be taken for granted.
Low likelihood of strategy change
The scope and outcome of such exploration by India and China remains unclear, although there was speculation about similar developments in the spring and summer of 2023 that did not materialize.
Even a tactical thaw will not be easy because it will require one or both sides to make concessions from their existing conflicting positions. India’s position is that the relationship is “broader than the border” and that the relationship will not return to normal if the border remains “abnormal.” China’s position is that the relationship is “broader than the border,” as reflected by the new Chinese ambassador’s assertion that “the border issue is not the whole story of the relationship.”
Appeasement could also be dangerous for India. Any demands from Beijing that curtail India’s balancing efforts of building domestic capabilities and partnerships abroad would be strategically risky. It could favor a more capable China, and there is no guarantee that Beijing will honor its commitments.
There are also political risks. The Modi government denies opposition accusations that it has accepted Chinese interests and a new normal on the border. But domestic critics will continue to scrutinize the government’s claims of a “return to peace and tranquility” (a government marker) and whether concessions have been made in the pursuit of stability. Any easing of economic restrictions on China could also face resistance from some Indian workers and businesses, given concerns about Chinese excess capacity and other factors.
Movement despite these obstacles could result in greater senior official and ministerial engagement, perhaps including a Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit, tactical coordination at the border, talks on updating border agreements, a revival of the idea of border demarcation, or even selective economic re-engagement and resumption of civil society exchanges.
But any big deals or, at least for now, any summit-level talks are unlikely. Prime Minister Modi will feel that he has been bitten twice as his previous summits with President Xi in September 2014 and from April 2018 to October 2019 failed to avert border crises.
Even if a new agreement is negotiated, New Delhi is likely to adopt a “trust but verify” stance as China is unlikely to respect it. Border fighting may decline further, but de-escalation in the much more militarized border areas and dismantling dual-purpose infrastructure will be more difficult to achieve. Instead, China and India are reportedly continuing to take steps to strengthen their territorial claims and military capabilities.
Moreover, even beyond the border, India and China have many differences that are becoming increasingly intense: vulnerabilities due to asymmetric economic ties and technological capabilities, deep ties with another Indian rival, Pakistan, China’s expanding strategic footprint in almost all of India’s neighbourhoods and in the Indian Ocean, China’s desire to shape the conditions in Asia as the dominant power, and China’s efforts to thwart India’s role and interests in the world order.
India is therefore unlikely to ease its efforts to compete with and contain China, especially as it seeks to strengthen its capabilities and partnerships. Moreover, Prime Minister Modi will not want Beijing to perceive him as weak after the Indian elections.
So is there an Indian effort to see whether a more stable relationship with China is possible? Yes, Prime Minister Modi can try, as he did in 2014, 2018, and 2019. But New Delhi will likely undertake such an effort mindful of the limitations of past efforts and with an understanding that in some areas, competition between China and India has hardly abated.
