This year’s annual joint Philippine-U.S. military exercise, Balikatan (April 22-May 10), broke a lot of new ground. So did China’s response to it. The training grounds and weapons deployed demonstrated the link between the disputed zones of the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. A surge in Chinese vessels in the exclusive economic zone west of Manila and another violent maritime incident over a disputed reef have revealed Beijing’s defiance of the alliance’s show of force.
The show of military force and the reaction to it have raised tensions in turbulent waters and called into question the deterrent value of the exercises. The symbolism and messaging show how the parties involved are pushing back, accepting further risks and narrowing the space for diplomacy.
A demonstration of expanded and evolved allied power
The 39th Balikatan exercise was described as the “most effective, most ambitious and most complex” to date. The exercise builds on progress made in recent editions of the annual exercise, which had served as a laboratory for testing new defence concepts and weaponry on the battlefield.
In 2022, U.S.-made Patriot missiles were deployed amphibiously from land and sea in Cagayan, one of the northernmost provinces of the Philippines, across from Taiwan.
Last year, live-fire Patriot and Avenger missile tests were conducted in the coastal province of Zambales on the West Philippine Sea, and for the first time, a sinking exercise (SINKEX) was conducted, in which a decommissioned corvette was used as a mock target to fire multiple missiles from land, air and sea platforms. The exercise was also conducted off the coast of Zambales, 235 kilometers from the Scarborough Shoal, a disputed area between Manila and Beijing.
This year, the 1,600-kilometer-range Typhon ground-launched missile made its appearance in joint army exercises ahead of Balikatan, and Patriot missile launchers were deployed for the first time to the former U.S. Air Force Base Clark in central Luzon.
It remains to be seen whether these weapons will ultimately be deployed to the locations agreed upon under the Philippine-US Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). The Typhon missiles remain stationed at undisclosed locations following the exercise, sparking speculation that they are currently deployed within the Philippines. EDCA bases were expanded from five to nine last year, with three new sites added in northern Luzon and one in southern Palawan.
If missiles were deployed in such a location, would China respond the way it did when South Korea allowed the U.S. military to install Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missiles on its territory? If so, that could further sour Manila’s faltering ties with its neighbor and largest trading partner. Beijing condemned the missile deployment. Chinese Defense Ministry spokesman Wu Qian said the missile deployment “brought great risks of war to the region,” adding that “medium-range missiles are strategic and offensive weapons with strong Cold War overtones.”
Recent Balikatan exercises have strengthened external defense and multi-domain orientation. This year’s exercises included island defense and recapture, air and missile defense, and cybersecurity and information operations. They also included for the first time the Philippine Coast Guard, an agency on the frontline in dealing with an increasingly powerful China in rough seas.
US HIMARS rockets were also fired at Palawan, a spearhead province bordering the South China Sea.
SINKEX was also carried out in Ilocos Norte, also in northern Luzon, the hometown of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. A Chinese-built ex-naval tanker was targeted, sparking speculation despite explanations that it was merely a coincidence.
Most significantly, for the first time, maritime activity extended beyond the country’s 12-nautical-mile territorial waters. France, which hopes to supply submarines to the Philippines, sent a frigate to join the Philippine and American submarine fleets as they sailed from the Sulu Sea into the South China Sea. This was Paris’ first time participating. Fourteen other countries, including South China Sea coastal states Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam, also sent observers.
China: Defiant and Undaunted
Manila’s unprecedented move was met with bolder measures from Beijing. Chinese government and militia vessels were spotted near Philippine outposts in the South China Sea, including three Chinese oceanographic survey vessels that were spotted at Second Thomas Shoal, a recent hotbed of tension between the two neighbours. Another was spotted off the coast of Catanduanes and Samar islands, on the Philippines’ eastern Pacific coast.
Four People’s Liberation Army Navy ships took turns pursuing a combined fleet of four ships, including two Philippine, one American and one French, which were conducting a multinational maritime exercise in the South China Sea.
While the Balikatan was underway, another incident occurred at Scarborough Shoal when two Philippine government vessels were rammed and damaged by water cannons from three Chin State Coast Guard vessels, following a March incident in which a Philippine civilian military-contracted vessel was similarly subjected to high-pressure water cannon fire from two Chinese Coast Guard vessels.
The Balikatan exercise, especially the presence of foreign navies, dashed hopes that China would behave appropriately and refrain from assertive actions. This latest maritime incident was condemned by several countries. But beyond flouting international law and damaging its reputation, China’s defiance sent a strong message: the stepped-up exercises no longer deter Beijing, nor Manila’s push for transparency in disputed waters.
Will this be a catalyst for allies to coordinate their response? China’s actions, including the injury of sailors and damage to property, still do not meet the definition of an “armed attack” that would trigger the U.S.’s vaunted commitment to its allies. The Scarborough Shoal incident may embolden China to further expand its scope of action. Further untoward incidents, in turn, may undermine confidence in allies’ ability to strike back beyond verbal rebukes.
A broader and more evolved Balikatan is part of the Philippines’ efforts to deepen defense ties with the United States and other partners to fend off China. It may be forced to reconsider if it does not achieve satisfactory results. This could weaken strong ties with its former colony and longtime treaty ally and align with China’s desire to exclude outside powers from intractable maritime disputes.
But despite the close calls, the parties to the conflict are accepting further risks. The Philippine government has remained tough, exposing Chinese activities in the disputed waters and participating in joint operations with allies and partners. With no high-level talks with Beijing in sight, diplomatic protests are mounting.
By contrast, the top U.S. and Chinese defense officials met in Singapore last month on the sidelines of this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue for the first time since 2022, part of a series of high-level official contacts aimed at stabilizing the rivalry as the U.S. heads to elections at the end of the year.
Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited China back-to-back in April last year, with Blinken’s visit coinciding with the early days of Balikatan.
While the South China Sea issue is just one of many thorny issues dividing the two great powers, and perhaps not the most pressing, China is refusing to back down and continues to increase pressure on its smaller neighbours, despite the presence of major allies.
If China’s response to this year’s Balikatan incident indicates the limits of deterrence, the South China Sea may be on the brink of further turmoil.
Lucio Blanco Pitro III is president of the Philippine Association for Chinese Studies and a research fellow at the Asia-Pacific Pathways to Progress Foundation.
