The hearing comes amid rising tensions in the Indo-Pacific region, U.S. moves to reduce reliance on Chinese supply chains and concerns in Washington that exports of advanced U.S.-made semiconductors to China are increasingly being diverted for military purposes.
The Chinese government considers Taiwan an integral part of China and should unify it, by force if necessary. The United States, like many other countries, does not recognize Taiwan’s independence, but opposes any changes to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and has pledged to supply arms to Taiwan.
Beijing’s domestic messaging about the need to “struggle” against foreign powers and remain “vigilant” appears more focused on easing domestic tensions than a sign of imminent plans for a military attack on Taiwan, given China’s economic difficulties, including the collapse of the real estate sector and chronic unemployment.
But they added that signs of possible future military operations could include a shift in social messaging that demonizes Taiwanese residents and a public education campaign warning of tougher times ahead.
Other signs include a rapid buildup of already substantial food, energy, and strategic mineral reserves; an emphasis on first aid, shelters, and other civil defense measures, especially in Fujian, Guangdong, and other areas around Taiwan; and a shift in propaganda messaging.
“What’s the tone? What’s the content?” said Lauri Partheimer, a professor at the University of Turku in Finland. “Maybe who’s allowed to speak? Is the Global Times disparaging America or is it being silenced? There are so many indicators to follow.”
Tightening restrictions on foreign companies, data flows, access to Chinese databases and academic exchanges have made it harder to gauge Beijing’s intentions, and witnesses say it is convinced the U.S. is trying to thwart its development and is seeking to contain it.
“There’s a fundamental shift happening, especially in the last three to four years, where security has taken priority over development,” said Manoj Kewalramani, chair of the Indo-Pacific Research Program and a China scholar at India’s Takshashila Institute.
“There is talk of a need to balance the two, but clearly security takes precedence.”
For example, China’s grain and oil reserves, which could be a precursor to a Taiwan conflict, are state secrets, but Beijing has legitimate concerns as urbanization leads to the loss of farmland, fewer agricultural workers, water resources become more scarce, and global warming intensifies.
“The ruling classes in this country have been hyper-sensitive to ensuring the food security of their people for millennia,” said Gustavo Ferreira, an economist at the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
“Continued famine and food insecurity will trigger political stability and the collapse of the regime,” he added.
“After all, to an outsider, [China’s] Actions to improve food security are merely governments’ reactions to this structural challenge or another step in preparing for conflict.”
The Committee monitors and investigates the national security implications of U.S. trade and economic relations with China. It has no direct legislative powers, but provides advice and recommendations to Congress on actions and policies.
Witnesses told the committee that under President Xi Jinping, China has begun to emphasize comprehensive national security, which increasingly influences the economy, finance, technology, diplomacy, maritime and space exploration, driving legal, structural and civil-military reforms.
Witnesses testified that while these reforms could certainly address legitimate domestic concerns, they could also serve a dual purpose.
For example, the Enhanced Emergency Management System developed by Beijing after the devastating 2008 Sichuan earthquake is intended to respond to natural disasters, but it also includes bomb shelters and supply depots and serves a parallel function of preparing for any conflict, they said.
“A lot of the things we’ve covered today, like disaster preparedness or internal reassuring messaging around national security or business struggles, can serve very different functions,” said Katja Dringhausen, program director at the Mercator Institute for China Studies in Germany.
“They may just be there for repairs, they may be there in case of a domestic crisis, they may be there in case of an international conflict.”

Witnesses said China has paid the price for a security-first response to domestic problems and for U.S. policies of building regional alliances and restricting technology exports.
Beijing’s zero-tolerance strategy to contain the pandemic has caused domestic consumer confidence to plummet and the economy is still struggling to recover.
Abroad, particularly in Europe, there is growing suspicion of China, with concerns over Beijing’s attempts at economic coercion and embracing Russia as a counterweight to the West, the researchers added.
But the witnesses also offered advice on how the United States can reduce tensions and avoid conflict.
That could include encouraging a more nuanced understanding among Western allies about the risk calculations of China’s use of force. The United States could also expand educational exchanges, tourism and other people-to-people exchanges to reduce the demonization of foreigners.
Other suggestions included building linkages with China’s emergency management system, for example through the provision of satellite weather data and assistance during natural disasters, and avoiding retaliatory security responses that reflect Beijing’s emphasis on “excessive securitization.”
“The Chinese Communist Party sounds like a big, scary, very nebulous organization, but at the end of the day it’s made up of leaders who are shaped by their worldview,” Drinhausen said. “But it’s also made up of people who want to have some predictability.”
“It’s really important to maintain communication and explain our goals to the Chinese side,” she added.