The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA-N) is currently building the Type 076 amphibious assault ship, which could play a pivotal role in any conflict with the United States over Taiwan.
Late last month, The Warzone reported that the warship could also be capable of carrying aircraft and strike forces, as well as supporting Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs) and other fixed-wing drones.
The ship, built at Shanghai’s Hudong Zhonghua Shipyard, will fill the gap between China’s largest amphibious ship, the Type 075, and its most advanced aircraft carrier, the Fujian, and marks a major step forward in China’s naval architecture.
The Type 076 will be approximately 864 feet long, with a width of 141 feet, giving it a larger flight deck than its predecessor. It may also be equipped with electromagnetic catapults and arresting landing systems, signaling a focus on a drone-centric naval strategy.
The Type 076 is in line with the PLA Navy’s efforts to strengthen its maritime strike, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and traditional amphibious assault capabilities. Construction of the ship is slated to begin around October 2023, highlighting China’s strong shipbuilding capabilities and ambitions to project naval power beyond its coastlines.
The War Zone report said the Type 076 demonstrates China’s determination to maintain a strong presence in contested areas such as the South China Sea, as well as in scenarios that could involve Taiwan.
The Type 076 is seen as part of an effort to address what remain significant gaps in China’s maritime delivery capabilities that may not be sufficient for a cross-Strait invasion.
In October 2023, the Asia Times noted that the PLA Navy’s amphibious assault ships could carry equipment equivalent to one heavy brigade and 21,000 soldiers during an initial invasion landing on Taiwan.
But Taiwan has about 1,200 tanks on standby, more than the PLA’s ability to conduct a single coordinated amphibious landing with less than half its force.
The People’s Liberation Army of China may be planning to send in 300,000 to 400,000 troops to occupy Taiwan quickly, following a decapitation attack aimed at removing Taiwan’s civilian and military leaders.
However, if the Taiwanese leadership survives the initial attack and is able to mobilize its military and civilian forces, the PLA may need to deploy more than 2 million troops, including police and paramilitary personnel, to Taiwan, ensuring a three-to-one or even five-to-one numerical advantage over Taiwan’s defense forces.
China might repurpose civilian ferries to fill its maritime capacity gap, but that approach would face significant challenges, including the survivability of civilian ferries against attack and the organizational ability of China’s merchant fleet to take on a war footing.
As debate continues over the usefulness of aircraft carriers in a future conflict given their increasing vulnerability to advanced ISR and anti-ship weapons, China may consider a drone carrier concept for its Type 076 amphibious assault ship.
In May 2024, the Asia Times noted that drone carriers would offer similar power projection advantages as traditional aircraft carriers by enabling unmanned aerial operations over long distances and across borders, expanding tactical, operational and strategic possibilities.
Unmanned systems are a safer and more economical alternative to manned aircraft and are well suited to risky missions such as ISR and light attack operations over land and sea. Drone carriers offer a cost-effective and feasible solution for middle-income countries to extend their air power over long distances without the need for land bases.
Countries may strengthen their unmanned aircraft capabilities in low-intensity conflict zones to support allies and weaken adversaries with limited air defenses. But until unmanned aircraft gain air superiority, drone-delivery aircraft are unlikely to represent a game changer in military affairs. Drones face significant limitations in environments with strong air defenses and electronic warfare capabilities.
In a Taiwan conflict, China would likely plan to use a large number of drones from land and sea to overwhelm Taiwan’s air defenses, a strategy that could serve as a prelude to larger air and missile attacks and ultimately an amphibious assault.
China may experiment with a “Lightning Carrier” concept, which would distribute naval aviation capabilities across more ships rather than concentrating them on a few large and potentially vulnerable supercarriers.
In December 2023, the Asia Times noted that the Lightning carriers would be able to carry around 20 fighter jets, fewer than the 50 a supercarrier could carry. These lighter carriers are designed to be more adaptable and economical.
As a light aircraft carrier, the Type 076 has the potential to offer great operational flexibility: It could carry drones and FC-31 stealth fighters on its deck, as well as host rotorcraft and deploy forces ashore in the event of an invasion of Taiwan.
Moreover, China’s vast shipbuilding capabilities could help it build more of these vessels, potentially increasing their survivability by distributing capabilities across multiple ships.
However, in February 2024, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) noted that the Chinese-made stealth fighter FC-31, a rival to the US F-35, has yet to be deployed to the People’s Liberation Army.
Comparing the two aircraft, the F-35’s top speed may be slower than the FC-31’s – Mach 1.6 compared to the FC-31’s Mach 1.8 – but it is believed to have a longer combat range of 1,240 km compared to the FC-31’s 1,207 km, Morningson News Agency, South Carolina, reported.
Regarding the PLA’s amphibious assault force ground forces, the Asia Times noted in January 2024 that China is steadily improving the quality and quantity of the PLA Marine Corps (PLA-MC), expanding its size from two to eight combined arms brigades.
The PLA-MC would be crucial in a potential attack on Taiwan, but would function as a supporting force rather than the main invasion force, as the PLA Ground Force (PLA-GF) has specialized amphibious assault forces for such a mission.
The People’s Liberation Army Marine Corps could provide six battalions to support an invasion, but is constrained by its compact size and limited experience in expeditionary missions.
However, China’s emerging light carriers and carrier fleets face numerous tactical and operational challenges due to their small air forces, vulnerability to hostile forces and limited value compared to land-based airfields.
The small air forces of China’s light carriers also create an “offense versus defense” dilemma: sending more aircraft to attack could make the fleet vulnerable to retaliatory air attacks, but committing more aircraft to fleet air defense would reduce its offensive power.
China’s light aircraft carriers, like their larger counterparts, are vulnerable to U.S. and allied anti-ship missiles, submarines and aircraft.
These limitations could also limit the strategic value of these light aircraft carriers compared to land-based airfields that have much greater carrying capacity, protection and survivability, although their stationary nature would limit the operational range of Chinese fighter jets.
However, China’s naval and air bases on Hainan island and in the South China Sea, and perhaps a recently upgraded base in ally Cambodia, could make up for any shortfalls in capabilities in China’s light carrier fleet.
