Does China already think it can easily take over Taiwan? Think again.

“All media is propaganda, we are just more honest about it,” reads the social media profile of Marshal Zhao, a member of the People’s Armed Police Propaganda Department. China’s strategy often relies on deception, but like many authoritarian regimes, the Chinese Communist Party often says exactly what it is doing and why it is doing it.

It is through this lens of propaganda and political warfare that China watchers should analyze the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) “punitive exercises” around Taiwan (collectively known as “United Sword 2024A”). Touted by Beijing as a response to Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te’s inaugural address on May 20, these exercises deployed Chinese air and naval assets to areas around Taiwan so that Beijing could isolate or blockade the island. These exercises were accompanied by propaganda videos produced by China’s Eastern Theater Command, which showed overwhelming volleys of rockets attacking targets in Taiwan. Slogans chanted during the videos stated the intent of these attacks: “Destroy the pillars of Taiwan independence! Attack the foundation of Taiwan independence! End the blood of Taiwan independence!”

When viewed together with China’s ongoing pressure campaign against Taiwan, an accelerating Chinese shipbuilding that increasingly dwarfs Western naval production, and a growing Chinese missile arsenal with ever-increasing threat ranges, it is easy to see the bleak outlook for Chinese invincibility. The message is clear: resisting a Chinese military occupation of Taiwan is futile. U.S. allies and partners considering defending Taiwan may question the feasibility and value of intervening against a powerful adversary like China. And Taiwanese policymakers and voters may be intimidated by the giant’s fist crushing the entire island nation. If resistance is futile, reducing the pain of future unification may be the wiser choice for Taiwan and the world.

This impression is exactly the effect China is seeking: a cognitive fait accompli. It wants the world to believe that it has already achieved a decisive victory and that there is nothing anyone can do.

But looking behind the propaganda, China’s real military power, while dangerous, is less impressive and more vulnerable than Beijing would have the world believe. That said, Chinese influence campaigns may be effective if they reinforce tendencies that China watchers already believe. For example, the Associated Press mistakenly used doctored photos from Chinese state media of a PLA military exercise. The story leaked out from there. Many newspapers, television, social media and academia are now telling the same story about Chinese superiority. In short, it has all the doctrinal hallmarks of an effective deception.

Russia employed a similar strategy prior to its all-out invasion of Ukraine in 2022, portraying its military as an overwhelming force. And while Russia is and will remain an existential threat to Ukrainian sovereignty, its mask of invincibility was quickly exposed by Ukraine’s fierce and sustained resistance against an enemy with significant material and numerical advantages. This is another riff on the David vs. Goliath story. What China and Russia forget is that in that story, David wins.

Exposing this deception and revealing the Chinese weaknesses it seeks to conceal requires a multipronged approach. First, policymakers and the analysts who inform them must understand the nature and depth of Beijing’s influence operations. Second, they must recognize China’s relative weaknesses and Taiwan’s strengths in an invasion scenario. Finally, they must fully refute the narrative of overwhelming Chinese strength and protect their own citizens from China’s malign influence operations.

China’s influence campaigns

China’s influence operations in pursuit of this cognitive fait accompli are operating across multiple lines of operations, most obviously through overt displays of military power in exercises such as Joint Sword 2024A and accompanying propaganda videos.

China’s campaigns are expanding on social media. The Chinese Communist Party UmaoTens of thousands of internet users are paid by the Chinese government to repeat regime propaganda and flock to people they believe to be critical of the regime, plus the government produces hundreds of millions of internet posts each year to distract users from discussion critical of the party.

These influence operations are conducted to influence Western audiences on the Chinese government-controlled social media platform Weibo, as well as X and other platforms, many of which continue to generate large followings and engagement despite their clumsiness.

Difficulties in attacking across the strait

This aggressive offensive on all information fronts is intended not only to convey China’s strength but also to conceal its weakness in the face of a potential military seizure of Taiwan, which would require both the isolation and blockade of Taiwan and an amphibious attack across the Taiwan Strait.

China certainly has the air and naval power to blockade the area around Taiwan, but maintaining the blockade could be strategically hazardous for Beijing if the blockade disrupts China’s economy, especially international trade. It is also operationally hazardous due to factors such as maintaining logistics, maintenance, and airspace control and coordination. Blockade demonstrations such as Joint Sword 2024A, although temporary, would be incredibly costly and stress China’s capabilities enough. A total and prolonged blockade over an extended period would place even greater stress on China’s military systems, making them doubtful of maintenance and vulnerable to interruption. If the United States and its allies were to intervene militarily, the “patrol box” boasted in China’s latest exercise illustrations could become a “kill box” for Taiwanese and U.S. forces to target Chinese vessels, especially those off Taiwan’s east coast.

It would be relatively easy for China to project power from its west coast to Taiwan’s east coast, and China would likely maintain an advantage along such a line of operations. However, Taiwan’s east coast would be more susceptible to support from allies and partners, who could intervene from Japanese or Philippine territory, or with air or naval power from the Pacific. China would likely maintain a military advantage in the Taiwan Strait, but maintaining it east of Taiwan would be a foolhardy endeavor.

Policymakers should also emphasize the difficulties of a cross-strait attack. An amphibious assault from China to Taiwan would be larger and more complex than the Allied invasion of Normandy in World War II, and would require joint planning and coordination that the fragmented and politically divided PLA military lacks. A more appropriate analogy might be the failed Gallipoli campaign by the Allied forces in World War I, because China would likely lack the capability to mount a surprise attack and would navigate dangerous waters loaded with mines and munitions. And while Chinese forces might eventually reach Taiwan’s shores, they would likely be stranded and contained. Establishing a base is one thing, securing and expanding it is another. A 2023 report by Mark F. Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham identifies many of the challenges China faces in establishing bases and other approaches the United States and Taiwan could pursue to contain or deter such bases. The inherent weaknesses of an authoritarian communist system only exacerbate these operational factors.

Countering China’s false narrative

Countering China’s malign rhetoric requires proactive and preemptive action. First, policymakers need to emphasize and communicate to the public, as far as classification and prudence permit, China’s weaknesses and Taiwan’s strengths in an invasion scenario. They should emphasize as often as possible the willingness of many Taiwanese to fight for their country’s independence and the strength and willingness of the United States and its allies and partners to support Taiwan in such a fight. In addition, they must demonstrate the strengthened defense of allies and partnerships that will continue to resist Chinese aggression and the combined impact it will have on Taiwan’s overall defense. Policymakers should highlight the example of Russia as an overconfident “emperor with no clothes” and note the similarities between Moscow and Beijing.

Finally, Taiwan and elsewhere should pursue a range of efforts to protect society from disinformation. Greater emphasis on cultivating and nurturing media literacy, from primary school through college, would foster more critical information consumers who are not easily fooled by disinformation in general, and Chinese disinformation in particular. Purposefully resourced units tasked with identifying and countering Chinese disinformation could coordinate with and strengthen their efforts with public relations and information departments of government agencies within pro-Taiwan countries.

By communicating the truth about China’s weaknesses and Taiwan’s strengths through multiple channels, Taiwan’s allies and partners can blunt the effectiveness of Chinese propaganda and pave the way for more informed and resilient approaches to support Taiwan’s security and stability in the Indo-Pacific region.

Lt. Col. Brian Karg is an adjunct fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategic Security. Lt. Col. Karg is an active duty U.S. Marine Corps operational planner, most recently serving as the G-5 Plans Director for III Marine Expeditionary Force.

The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the position or opinions of the U.S. Marine Corps, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. Government.

Tiger Project, an Atlantic Council initiative, develops new insights and actionable recommendations for the United States and its allies and partners to deter and counter aggression in the Indo-Pacific. Explore our collection of work, including expert commentary, multimedia content, and in-depth analysis on strategic defense and deterrence issues in the region.

References

Image: Armed police special forces conduct a tactical search in Hezhou, China, on January 2, 2024. (Photo by Costfoto/NurPhoto)