Georgian Dream came to power after the 2012 parliamentary elections, the first change of government in Georgia’s history. As a coalition party, it signed the EU-Georgia Association Agreement (2014-2016) and visa liberalization (2017). Initially, it appeared to be a pro-democracy party. However, its most recent authoritarian transgressions have been manifested in the adoption of the controversial Law on “Transparency of Foreign Influence” (28 May 2024). The law aims to weaken local pro-democracy forces and insulate Georgia from international pressure for democracy.
Since independence, Georgia has always sought membership in the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The rationale behind this Euro-Atlantic integration was simple: to contain Russian political and military aggression and achieve economic growth and political stability through integration with the West. The issue of territorial integrity was the main driver for Georgia’s entry into NATO, while EU integration was seen as a catalyst for strengthening democracy. The United States and the European Union jointly supported Georgia’s statehood. Conversely, Russia supported the separatist forces in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the early period of Georgia’s independence and attempted to undermine Georgia’s statehood multiple times. These separatist conflicts led to ethnic cleansing and internal displacement of Georgians. Furthermore, Russia invaded Georgia in August 2008. Georgia’s foreign policy has been pro-Western since independence, which is preserved in Article 78 of the Georgian Constitution. Previous governments have not attempted to shift to a pro-Western orientation, as such a shift would have led to increased electoral costs. But inexplicably, the Georgian government, led by Georgian Dream, has made the risky decision to align with Russia.
The United States, the EU and NATO have been important promoters of democracy in Georgia. Since independence, Western democratization advocates have jointly supported Georgia’s state-building and democracy-building projects, investing billions of dollars and transferring knowledge on good governance. The Georgian government has been open to such democratic support. This openness is seen as a key factor in achieving desired democratic outcomes. A reliable local partner serves as an internal pillar to avoid unintended consequences of international democratic support. Democracy advocates in Georgia and elsewhere achieve success when they empower democratic veto holders within the political elite, along with civil society and the media, three key areas essential for strengthening democracy and establishing the rule of law. However, the adoption of the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence indicates that the Georgian government wants to sever political ties with the West by removing such important veto holders in the country.
The Georgian government has shown ambivalence and stumbled on its path to Europe. Parliamentary elections in October 2024 will reveal what electoral costs this foreign policy shift will have for the ruling party. So far, the Georgian Dream has successfully used fear-soothing rhetoric, arguing that a Russia-Ukraine war could lead to an escalation of the regional war and destabilize Georgia. At this politically crucial moment, the Georgian government has refrained from explicitly stating its position, instead stating that “he who is not against us is for us”, which could be interpreted as an implicit vulnerability to Russian authoritarian pressure.
While Russia is waging a self-destructive war against Ukraine, it can stoke instability by using proxies to pit opposing political forces against each other and to spread its authoritarian policies abroad. Moreover, Russia has geopolitical motives to destabilize Georgia. After the Russo-Ukrainian war, the EU is seeking safe economic and energy routes to minimize the negative impacts arising from its energy dependency on Russia. This was a strategic mistake aimed at temporarily containing Russia’s authoritarian policies. Russia-fomented instability aims to destabilize regional peace and disrupt global economic routes. The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), also known as the Central Corridor, connects China with Europe. Russia wants to limit this connectivity and maintain its advantage. for Strengthening control over the South Caucasus, which links the Caspian and Black Sea regions, gives China and Europe an advantage.
Similarly, Russia supports authoritarian changes in Georgia, seeking to counter international democratization efforts by weakening pro-democracy forces and spreading authoritarian norms, as well as supporting illiberal powers that have no intention of cooperating with the West. For example, the European Union granted Georgia candidate status in December 2023. However, Georgia lagged behind Moldova and Ukraine, which began accession negotiations with the EU on June 25, 2024. It is possible that Russia sought to increase authoritarian pressure on the Georgian government and steer it away from the European path. These violations can also be explained by the Georgian ruling class’ unwillingness to follow EU policies and limit its own political power in the interest of Georgia’s Europeanization and subsequent democratization. This strategic decision will provide impetus for Georgians to escape Russian influence and defend their values-based democratic choices in the parliamentary elections scheduled for October 2024.
The Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence has two domestic consequences. First, the law is unconstitutional as it goes against the spirit of Article 78 of the Georgian Constitution, which requires constitutional authorities to take all measures to ensure Georgia’s full integration into the EU and NATO. Second, EU and US officials have condemned the adoption of the law on the grounds that it is incompatible with EU values and Georgia’s declared strategic foreign policy objectives. The law bans pro-democracy forces from participating in politics and promotes the exclusion of pro-democracy forces by stigmatizing them as foreign agents, which damages the reputation of civil society organizations and the media.
The current electoral system and new regulations introduce complexity and uncertainty into Georgia’s elections. Article 109 of the Election Law allocates seats to parties that receive at least 5% of the valid votes. Article 125 outlines how the number of seats each party will win will be calculated. Due to high electoral standards and these calculation rules, opposition parties have an incentive to form coalitions to increase their chances of winning more seats. Article 766 Georgia allows electronic voting using ballots with barcodes and QR codes, which are counted by electronic voting machines and results are reported in real time. This requires in-country observers to undergo extensive training to ensure that the electronic voting machines comply with Georgia’s election law. In this context, Georgian Dream reintroduced and passed a law on transparency of foreign influence that it had previously withdrawn due to its weakness in the elections.
Local non-governmental organizations scrutinize the electoral process through observer missions. The law is likely to impose restrictions on NGOs and media before and on election day, with huge fines and seizure of property if not complied with. After the elections, the Russian-influenced law could be used as a political bargaining tool for Georgian Dream to form a coalition government. Its offshoots and suspected satellite parties have less chance of breaking through the 5% electoral threshold in the parliamentary elections. However, if the foreign influence transparency law is used to restrict international observers, the government will jeopardize the legitimacy of the parliamentary elections and pressure the opposition to mobilize voters in the streets to defend democracy. It can be argued that under these circumstances, Russia may consider military intervention or empower its proxy parties to incite domestic unrest.
There are three main scenarios for the upcoming elections. First, the opposition could win a majority and form a government if it strategically realigns itself to attract middle-class voters and downplay the divisive role of former President Saakashvili. This would require a joint electoral list, regional campaigning, and strong leadership. The pro-European opposition front has already committed to defeating the Georgian Dream and returning Georgia to the European orbit, and took the first step towards this goal with the Pro-European Declaration signed in Brussels on 24 June 2024. However, this scenario is unlikely to materialize without an opposition unity that also attracts moderate supporters of the Georgian Dream disappointed by recent foreign policy changes.
Second, Georgian Dream would win a majority. However, widespread discontent and opposition among young voters makes it unlikely that Georgian Dream will win a simple majority. Despite leveraging administrative resources, the party faces moral disadvantage from U.S. sanctions and corruption scandals. Full authoritarianism is unlikely due to limited resources, potential backlash from severing ties with the West, and popular demand for democracy with 63% of the population supporting the coalition government.
Finally, there is a scenario of a coalition government. The opposition could form two main groups, raising the possibility of a coalition government between the opposition and the GD. One group could include President Zourabichvili’s Georgian Charter parties and the opposition splitting off from Georgian Dream, while the other could include the UNM and other allied parties. Power-sharing with Georgian Dream could be facilitated by EU accession negotiations and potential EU sanctions against the authoritarian leader. However, while this scenario could create instability, it could also foster consensus building and strengthen Georgia’s democratic future.
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