By the spring of 2024, China had accepted the reality that the chances of President Trump’s reelection were not only real but substantial. As of May 22, 2024, former U.S. President Donald Trump held a 0.9% lead over President Joe Biden in national presidential polls, with 41.1% approval rating and Biden at 40.2%, according to national polling organization FiveThirtyEight. The criminal conviction does not seem to have had much of an impact on voters, as shown by Trump’s 1.7% lead, according to FiveThirtyEight’s May 30 data. The outcome of a U.S. election is difficult to predict and could go in any direction until Election Day. However, it is fair to say that there is a good chance that Trump will win. Beijing therefore needs to prepare for escalating tensions with the United States on multiple fronts, as well as increased uncertainty and instability.
Who does China prefer: Trump or Biden?
The question of which candidate China prefers has been settled long ago. Chinese experts have openly stated that both candidates are “poison” for China, regardless of who wins. In their view, Biden may bring more stability to bilateral relations, but his competitive strategy has been quite effective both economically and diplomatically, leaving China’s high-tech industry and diplomatic offensive in limbo. In comparison, Trump’s position on US alliances and partnerships, and the damage he may cause, will serve Beijing’s strategic agenda in the long run. In the short run, however, Trump’s unpredictability and use of maximum pressure will put China in an extremely difficult situation, making him a less desirable option from China’s point of view. For Chinese officials and elites who had to suffer the steep decline of US-China relations during the last year of the Trump administration, it is mind-boggling and psychologically traumatic to imagine Trump serving another term and how China will deal with it. However, since China is not in a position to actively influence the outcome of the US presidential election, but rather to passively receive it, which candidate China will support is considered a moot question. Ultimately, that is not China’s choice. But given that there is a real chance that Trump will be re-elected, the immediate question for Beijing is how to deal with Trump, his team and his China policy.
The US-China trade war could intensify under the Trump administration
Current Chinese assessment is that a second term of the Trump administration will likely lead to a tougher US stance on trade and economic relations with China, leading to greater decoupling of the two economies. Earlier this year, as part of his campaign speeches, Trump proposed imposing tariffs of at least 60% on all Chinese products and a flat 10% tariff on products of all origins. If the first term is any precedent, these tariffs will not be mere threats. China’s Ministry of Commerce has called the trade war during Trump’s first term “the largest trade war in the history of the world economy.” Pursuant to his 2016 campaign promise, on March 22, 2018, Trump imposed Section 301 tariffs on $60 billion worth of Chinese products to pressure China to change its “unfair trade practices.” On July 6, 2018, an additional 25% tariff was imposed on $34 billion worth of Chinese products. The Chinese Ministry of Commerce retaliated the same day by imposing 25% tariffs on $34 billion worth of U.S. products, including soybeans, one of the most important agricultural exports from the U.S. to China. However, as President Trump’s first term also showed, China does not have the ability to retaliate on an equal footing with the U.S. Given the imbalance in U.S.-China trade and the large U.S. trade deficit, it is clear that China cannot impose the same total amount of tariffs on U.S. exports to China in 2023. U.S. exports to China were $147 billion, while China’s imports from the U.S. were $427 billion. This simple fact shows that China does not have enough influence to impose tariffs on U.S. exports to China. It should also be remembered that some items, such as high-performance semiconductor chips, that the U.S. exports to China are desperately needed by China. Therefore, it is not in China’s interest to impose tariffs on these, even for retaliatory purposes. That said, China would resist if the trade war escalated. After all, Beijing must also deal with domestic pressure and external criticism. Years of tough stances against the United States under President Xi Jinping have strengthened Chinese nationalism and pushed Beijing into a corner, which will likely result in escalation and instability.
How will China exploit President Trump’s diplomatic strategy?
In the field of foreign policy and security, China has not yet drawn its conclusion on how President Trump’s reelection will affect China. Given Trump’s isolationist tendencies and tendency to evaluate security relations with allies and partners in terms of economic cost-benefit, Beijing’s default assumption is that a second Trump presidency would seriously undermine the credibility of the United States and its global partnerships with allies and partners. And that is to China’s benefit. China is ready to exploit Trump’s isolationist tendencies in this regard. Most immediately, China expects Trump’s reelection to result in a cut in U.S. security engagement and military aid to the Ukrainian war. As evidence of this, a secret plan to end the war within 24 hours at the expense of Ukrainian territory, if Trump is elected, has been widely circulated in China. If this were to happen, European confidence in NATO and U.S. security engagement would be reduced, which would, in China’s eyes, promote two things in Europe: a growing desire for strategic autonomy and a possible more pragmatic and moderate stance on how to end the Ukrainian war. Both are the outcomes China desires. In Asia, the Chinese believe that the waning of U.S. involvement under the Trump administration will force allies, especially Japan and South Korea, to recalibrate their relations with China, especially if North Korea becomes provocative again.
Further Potential Challenges in Diplomatic Relations
China has yet to decide which direction the Taiwan issue will take with President Trump’s reelection. In January 2024, President Trump complained that Taiwan was “taking all of America’s semiconductor business.” And while some believe there is a slight chance that the United States will abandon Taiwan under the Trump administration, China finds it hard to believe. Beijing vividly remembers that the first term of the Trump administration saw the most dramatic change in the U.S.’s attitude and position toward Taiwan in the past decades, such as when then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo suddenly lifted the U.S. government rules that prohibited exchanges between U.S. and Taiwanese diplomats. According to the Washington Post, the move “represented a symbolic but significant improvement in the U.S.’s relationship with the democratic island.” China does not believe that President Trump wanted to go to war with China over Taiwan, but sees Trump’s coddling of his team on the Taiwan issue as the result of an overall “maximum pressure” campaign to get China to cave in on other areas, such as trade. If that is true, the US and China will face even more turmoil over Taiwan if President Trump wins a second term. Russia is also an ambiguous part. After all, in Trump’s first term, one of Beijing’s biggest concerns was a rapprochement between Washington and Moscow, leaving Beijing isolated and helpless. And one could argue that if the US really sees China as a major long-term strategic threat, Washington needs to improve relations with Russia and weaken Sino-Russian collusion. But Trump’s first term proved that improving relations with Russia is politically unfeasible even for Trump. The Ukraine war makes that scenario even less likely, and after 2022, Sino-Russian cooperation is stronger than ever. But the possibility of US-Russian detente, especially under President Trump, always comes to mind as Beijing’s worst nightmare. There are more concerns in other areas of bilateral relations as well. During the first term of the Trump administration, China was aware of the Trump camp’s tendency to distinguish between the Chinese people and the Chinese Communist Party, which suggested that delegitimizing the regime was their ultimate goal. This has killed all possibility of political dialogue and cooperation between the US and Chinese governments. As a result, discussions on global issues such as climate change and nuclear non-proliferation have been stifled. Perhaps anticipating the possibility that dialogue and cooperation mechanisms may come to a halt under the Trump administration, China has been working since last year to build such mechanisms to strengthen the foundation of bilateral relations. If Trump wins, the next four years are expected to be unstable, and China wants to secure more venues and channels in preparation for that.
Chinese takeaway
As China strategizes how to deal with a second term of the Trump administration, there are two main lessons to be learned. The first is the painful realization that China has limited capacity to effectively block or counter the Trump administration’s second-term China policies, even if they are contrary to China’s interests. This is highly frustrating for Beijing. An alternative, more reassuring interpretation is that a return of Trump to the White House would allow China to reduce its economic dependence on the United States and pursue its own parallel world order. But that is more of a reaction, not a preference. The second lesson is that much of the modalities of Trump’s China policy will depend on the composition of his team, not on Trump himself. Beijing is therefore closely watching who joins Trump’s team and what their China backgrounds say about their potential preferences. Chinese interlocutors have attempted to reach out and build relationships, especially with those working on China. But these direct efforts have been more or less blocked by Beijing, fearing potential accusations that Beijing is trying to interfere in the 2024 elections. Beijing is wary of the consequences and is cautious, especially since the overt nature of such outreach leaves little room for denial. The bottom line for 2024 is that China seeks stability with the Biden administration, and China’s efforts to build more dialogue, channels and cooperation are also to prepare for the potential scenario in which relations with the United States plummet again. China, in particular, is spending much more effort to engage with U.S. states at the local level and to build people-to-people ties at the societal level. Rarely has China felt so powerless in influencing the future policies of a U.S. administration with regard to Trump. Once upon a time, China was confident in its business relationship and believed there was a floor to tensions between the U.S. and China. But that is no longer the case.
If Trump wins, Beijing will seek to stabilize relations and coexistence, but above all, China is preparing for the impact on everything from trade to Taiwan, political relations to diplomatic ties.
