Modi will be the first prime minister in modern India to complete a 10-year term and begin a third five-year term, a stark contrast to the famous Nehru era.
No doubt, PM Modi has risen from humble beginnings to leave a trail of proactive leadership and geopolitical and economic achievements that have left a mark not only in India but also across the world, but at home he is also criticised for dragging the country away from the secular and enlightened foundations on which it was supposedly founded.
It is often said that the first decade of the Modi government was marked by illiberalism, exclusivity, ethno-nationalism, xenophobia, rigidity and hardline stance against minorities, press and media. These socio-political deviations, apart from the incumbency factor, may prove costly for the BJP in the 2024 elections, despite its remarkable economic success.
In its relations with its regional neighbours, especially its largest western neighbour, one would not expect any Indian leader or government to feel more comfortable and content in seeking to enter into a cooperative relationship with Pakistan.
As he enters his 15th year of rule, we may see Modi aspire to leave behind a legacy of peace between India and Pakistan that no other leader has managed to achieve in the past 75 years, despite other achievements.
Those in power always seek to leave behind a storied legacy, and unless there is a great détente between Pakistan and India, bringing poverty alleviation and welfare to the people of these regions, where 40 percent and 67 percent of the population respectively live below the poverty line, those who have achieved national revival, restoration and progress will likely find themselves at the end of it all incomplete.
Prime Minister Modi’s friendly approach to Pakistan may cause uproar among moderates aligned with Indian right-wing nationalists who bitterly remember Kargil, the Parliament attack, the Bombay terror attacks and the Pathankot and Pulwama attacks that led to a nuclear blast, but no Indian government other than Modi’s 15-year-old one is likely to be at odds with Pakistan.Number Will we be in an easy position to improve our relations with Pakistan and achieve the highest interest of our external relations after a one-year lease?
In 2024, two new governments have come to power on either side of the zero line. Both governments face their own strategic, political, social and economic challenges, strengths and weaknesses. Modi’s NDA government may be politically downsized compared to the previous two governments, but it can be expected to continue to deliver strong economic results.
Pakistan seems to have undergone a paradigm shift with the civilian government moving closer to the so-called establishment, as opposed to the military-backed parties that emerged in the 2011s. These parties are now in conflict with the establishment due to the VONC (allegedly run by the US and the then military chiefs, respectively), which until the very end proposed that they would be given life tenure if VONC collapsed.
Former Army Chief General Bajwa extended a friendly hand to India towards the end of his term, advocating for “geo-economics” rather than “geo-politics”. The then civilian government then advocated partial opening of border trade with India. Hawkish elements in the government were quick to point out that their political opponents were “Modi says, Gaddal hei, Gaddal hei.These were the accusations levelled at the government of the day during Prime Minister Modi’s historic surprise visit to Lahore in December 2015.
In the current new regional geopolitical environment, there is a powerful lobby that believes that any move towards some semblance of India-Pakistan cooperation, however tentative and risky, has its best chance of coming to fruition while Modi is in power in Delhi and Nawaz Sharif remains the political godfather of the ruling party. Moreover, the government can count on active support from other major coalition partners.
Bajwaism, which has tended to be open, even tentatively, to India without compromising on fundamental issues, continues to underpin the army’s basic stance.
The compelling forces guiding such a policy are quite clear: the dire state of the economy has left the military facing severe financial difficulties in the absence of military aid from the US and Western countries, and it is struggling to compete for scarce resources and civilian uses in a tense political environment.
On the Pakistani side, there seems to be once again a moment where both the military and the government are on the same page on the issue of improved relations with its eastern neighbor and are aware of the enormous economic benefits that would accrue to Pakistan through trade opening. Trade opening could bring Pakistan up to $30-40 billion in merchandise trade, in addition to other economic ripple effects. Opening up land trade would help significantly reduce inflation in consumables and provide immediate relief to the general public.
It was track three diplomacy that led to a ceasefire across the Line of Control between India and Pakistan on February 25, 2021. This ceasefire proved to be the longest-lasting CBM and LOC ceasefire in over a decade since 2016. This ceasefire is notable for its durability despite changes in political and military leadership on both sides, terror attacks, and changing regional relations.
With no ceasefire in place, the LOC has become one of the most violent regions in the world, with civilians often taking the largest share of casualties from violence that has little operational or strategic purpose. Even this localized violence could escalate between the two nuclear-armed states as the media environment between the two countries becomes increasingly tense.
While significant risks to peace remain in the absence of a solid institutional foundation for diplomatic relations and in a climate rife with mutual recriminations and suspicions, the continuation of the LOC ceasefire since February 2021 could be an opportunity to i) resume overt dialogue channels, ii) institutionalize LOC normalization, and iii) intensify consideration of other military, economic and civilian CBMs.
