Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif recently returned from an official visit to China during which he not only met with President Xi Jinping, Premier Li Qiang and other senior government officials, but also met with Chinese business leaders at the Pakistan-China Business Forum 2024 in Shenzhen.
According to Pakistani media, the Prime Minister made a clear and strong statement of his commitment to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Prime Minister Sharif’s views on CPEC have been highly appreciated by China since his time as Chief Minister of Punjab. Due to the speedy execution of CPEC projects in Punjab, Chinese diplomats have given the Prime Minister the title “Shehbaz Speed”.
But the importance of the visit was not just to convey Pakistan’s commitment to CPEC, but also to convince its hosts of Pakistan’s determination to address two key concerns that China has consistently raised: Pakistan’s stability and security. Political instability in Pakistan has exacerbated the country’s economic woes, the security situation in Pakistan has deteriorated with Chinese nationals increasingly being targeted, and China’s “flagship” Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has lost its luster.
These issues figured prominently in the China-Pakistan Joint Communiqué for 2024, issued at the end of Prime Minister Sharif’s visit in early June. Further insights into relations can be gained by comparing this latest statement with the other three: the 2018 joint communiqué issued after former Prime Minister Imran Khan’s visit to China, the 2022 joint communiqué after the visit of Khan’s successor Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, and finally the 2023 joint communiqué after the visit of caretaker Prime Minister Anwar-ul-Haq Kakar.
These statements, agreed to by the two governments, clarify some of the issues that have been discussed privately between the two countries, so changes to these documents could reveal shifts in priorities for both countries.
Stability and bilateral relations
The twin slogans of “stability” and “security” were first raised during then Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang’s visit to Pakistan in May 2023. His visit came almost a year after former Prime Minister Imran Khan was replaced by Shehbaz Sharif following a parliamentary vote of no confidence. Qin explained that stability is a prerequisite for development, while security is the foundation of a country’s strength and prosperity. He publicly rebuked Pakistani officials with “friendly advice” to forge a consensus among themselves and bring stability and development to the country.
Qin’s visit was followed by further political turmoil in Pakistan, including Khan’s arrest and riots across the country, which officials are now calling “black days.” While China maintains it continues to support CPEC, political instability and security issues in Pakistan appear to be adversely affecting relations between the two countries.
China and Pakistan describe their relationship as an all-weather strategic cooperative partnership that has weathered global challenges. For Pakistan, China is a keystone of its foreign policy, which is reflected in all four joint statements reviewed. However, since the 2023 joint statement, China appears to have changed its perspective on its relationship with Pakistan.
In both the 2018 and 2022 joint statements, China described relations with Pakistan as China’s “top foreign policy priority.” But in the 2023 joint statement, and the 2024 joint statement released earlier this month, China-Pakistan relations are described simply as a “foreign policy priority” for China. The adjective “top priority,” which describes Pakistan’s priority in China’s foreign policy, has been omitted in the more recent statements.
This raises many questions. The fact that this statement was made twice in succession in joint statements suggests that it was not a mistake. It raises the possibility that China has decided to downgrade its relationship with Pakistan from a “top priority” to a “priority” in its foreign relations. This may reflect how China now views its relationship with Pakistan, a decade after selecting CPEC as the flagship project of the BRI.
safety
Other changes seen in the 2024 Joint Statement compared to previous ones are on security, for example, there is a specific mention of the suicide bombing attack on Chinese engineers working on the Das Dam project. This reflects China’s serious concerns over Pakistan’s security measures for its citizens in Pakistan. Chinese officials wanted Pakistan to not only hunt down the culprits but also to give strict punishment for the crime.
Pakistan has for the first time fired security officials and police officers who were guarding the convoy that was attacked after the 2024 Bhisham attack, which killed five Chinese engineers, including a woman. After this latest suicide attack, it has been suggested that China is pressuring Pakistan to carry out a major military operation against militants who are resisting.
While China may be focused on militants inside Pakistan, Pakistan seems more concerned about what is happening inside Afghanistan, as reflected in the 2024 Joint Statement. While the statement mentions cooperation and coordination between the two countries on Afghanistan, it does not mention support for Afghanistan’s development as seen in the 2018 and 2022 Joint Statements. The 2022 statement, released during Sharif’s visit to China, also mentions the expansion of CPEC into Afghanistan, but there is no such mention in the 2023 and 2024 Joint Statements.
However, what the 2024 Joint Statement actually did was to hold the Afghan interim government (the Taliban) accountable for the first time to fight terrorism decisively and not allow its territory to be used for terrorist activities. This reflects Pakistan’s recent security concerns over terrorist incidents (including attacks on Chinese nationals) planned in Afghanistan and carried out on its territory. Pakistan’s Interior Minister, at a press conference, had specifically called on the Taliban government to arrest and hand over the alleged masterminds of the Bhisham suicide attack that killed five Chinese engineers and their driver.
It is interesting to note that the joint statement uses words like “trust” and “cooperation” many times to describe the relationship between the Chinese and Pakistani militaries. However, the 2024 statement also mentions that the two countries have built close ties, presumably referring to joint military exercises. This closeness has led some to call the Sino-Pakistani relationship a “border alliance.”
CPEC
Some of the CPEC projects mentioned in the 2024 Joint Statement appear to have undergone some slight tweaks. While the ML-1 railway project, an early harvest project, is still included (it was missing from the 2018 Joint Statement), the Karachi Circular Railway, which was mentioned as an urgent requirement in the 2022 Joint Statement, was not. It is also not included in the 2023 Joint Statement, reflecting a decline in priority.
Progress on the ML-1 project under Sharif’s government has been modest, with some seeing China only agreeing to go ahead with the first phase. Chinese state insurer Sinosure, which has approved compulsory insurance for major CPEC projects, has expressed concern that Pakistan has not paid outstanding dues to Chinese power companies operating in the country under CPEC. Its financial concerns over current CPEC projects go some way to explaining the slow progress on the expensive ML-1 project and why no new major CPEC projects were identified in the 2024 joint statement. With Pakistan’s growing circular debt crisis stifling the country’s growth, new and expensive projects will have to wait.
The 2024 Joint Statement maintains third-party investment priority sectors such as agriculture, IT, industry, and science and technology, but replaces oil and gas from the 2022 Joint Statement with mining. It is also notable that the Chinese government has committed to actively encouraging Chinese companies to invest in Pakistan’s offshore oil and gas projects. Similarly, the Chinese government has committed to encouraging Chinese companies to invest in Pakistan’s special economic zones, provided that the projects meet market and commercial principles. In other words, such investments are purely business and do not confer any special benefits on Pakistan.
The joint statements issued by China and Pakistan are a good barometer of where CPEC is headed. The 2024 joint statement highlighted an “upgraded version of CPEC” with eight major steps in line with Pakistan’s “5E Framework,” but there are no new major projects to show for it yet. But more importantly, the statements reveal the state of the relationship between the two countries, with Pakistan being demoted from “top priority” to “priority” in China’s foreign policy in both 2023 and 2024, for example. Pakistan appears yet to allay China’s concerns about the stability and security of Chinese nationals in Pakistan.
