At the 37th Asia-Pacific Roundtable recently held in Kuala Lumpur, differences of opinion among Southeast Asian countries on the South China Sea issue were evident across panels, speeches and impromptu comments as delegates discussed opportunities for regional cooperation and the centrality of ASEAN in an environment of worsening great power tensions.
Malaysian National Security Council Secretary-General Raja Dato’ Nusirwan Zainal Abidin said the South China Sea accounts for at most 4 percent of bilateral relations between Malaysia and China, after Malaysia downplayed the issue and reiterated its willingness to negotiate with China.
Last April, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim said he was ready to negotiate with China over Chinese concerns about Malaysia’s state-run energy company Petronas developing a carbon capture project in the Kasawari gas field, which is claimed by both countries.
Anwar was criticized by the domestic opposition for legitimizing China’s claims in the region, but he defended the accusation by claiming he was simply open to negotiations. Whether true or not, Anwar continues to stress the need to negotiate with China and that China abide by the rules set out in the ASEAN Code of Conduct.
The problem is that other claimants, particularly the Philippines, may not believe negotiations are the best way to counter Chinese activity in the South China Sea, which under the leadership of Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has reversed its previous close relationship with China under the Duterte administration.
The escalating standoff between Manila and Beijing in recent months has been reflected in increasingly unsettling rhetoric from both sides. President Marcos, implicitly referring to China’s recent drills around Second Thomas Shoal, warned that any deaths of Filipino nationals caused by “deliberate acts” would be treated as something very close to an act of war.
Philippine Defense Secretary Gilbert Teodoro added that the South China Sea issue was an “existential” issue for the country – a far cry from Malaysia’s stance on the dispute.
The stark difference between the approaches of Kuala Lumpur and Manila – and therefore between Manila’s more proactive stance and ASEAN’s non-interference stance – has important implications for intra-ASEAN linkages and the importance of the organisation.
Manila will no doubt be seeking to diversify its sources of security and seek support from regional and global powers that may back its claims amid ASEAN’s hesitancy.
The Philippines is stepping up defense drills with the United States and buying more weapons from the country as it regains its status as a key security partner for Manila after a brief withdrawal under the Trump administration.
At the same time, Manila is courting the EU, with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen promising to step up maritime security cooperation with the Philippines, a statement underscored by discussions of defense agreements with the Netherlands and Norway.
Foreign Minister Teodoro has also been active in the region, meeting with the defense ministers of South Korea and Singapore on the sidelines of the 21st Shangri-La Dialogue to strengthen security ties.
Manila has indicated that if ASEAN, especially a Malaysia-led ASEAN in 2025, does not support its position, it will shy away from it and look for concrete support from elsewhere.
These rifts are not temporary or limited to the current administration: As nationalism in the region grows over territorial claims in the South China Sea and world powers such as the United States and China prepare to court allies in the burgeoning conflict, differences among ASEAN member states over how to handle the disputes are only widening.
These differences may ultimately leave ASEAN powerless and helpless as the region seeks a new security architecture.
Olivia Tang, senior analyst for Asia at Onyx and head of the firm’s China practice, is a junior leader at Pacific Forum.. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own. The content herein does not necessarily reflect the views of Expeditors and its affiliates, divisions, subsidiaries, officers, directors and employees.
This article was originally published by Pacific Forum and is republished with permission.
