Vadi asserted that in the short term, “the outlook for strategic arms control is bleak.” Russia has refused to negotiate, and New START, the last U.S.-Russia treaty limiting strategic nuclear weapons, which limits the number of warheads on missiles, submarines, and heavy bombers, respectively, expires in 2026. Vadi said there is probably “no replacement treaty.” Meanwhile, China has never signed a nuclear arms agreement with the U.S. and has not shown any interest in nuclear arms control. Conversely, Vadi noted that China, which has historically possessed a small number of nuclear weapons, is “growing and diversifying” its nuclear arsenal “at a ferocious pace,” as are Russia and North Korea. By refusing to discuss limitations, these three geopolitically aligned adversaries “are forcing the U.S. and its close allies and partners to prepare for a world of nuclear competition without numerical constraints,” he said.
To understand why this new arms race is dangerous, look back at where we were last time. The United States and the Soviet Union had a combined total of more than 60,000 nuclear warheads in a conflict that threatened mutual, possibly global, annihilation. The risk of accidental launch increases when great powers keep their nuclear weapons on fire-ready alerts, as the United States and Russia do today. Fortunately, arms control treaties and the end of the Cold War have eased tensions between the two countries and their respective nuclear arsenals. So it was especially significant when Vadi said that the reduction in nuclear stockpiles over the past 25 years may now be reversed. “Unless there is a change in the trajectory of our adversaries’ nuclear stockpiles, we may reach a point in the next few years where we will need to increase from the current numbers deployed,” he said.
China has more than 500 nuclear warheads and aims to have more than 1,000 by 2030. By comparison, the United States and Russia currently deploy 1,550 warheads each. An arms race among the three countries poses complex strategic challenges — even more complex than the U.S.-Soviet rivalry. Should the U.S. aim to match the combined power of Russia and China, or should it aim for one or the other? How will Moscow and Beijing respond? Badi said the U.S. will pursue “better” nuclear weapons, not necessarily “more” ones. The U.S. “does not need to build up its nuclear arsenal to match or outnumber its competitors in order to successfully deter them,” he said. That’s a good thing, but no one knows whether this thinking will hold up in future arms races, or whether Russia and China can make a similar calculation.
Vadi also warned that efforts by Russia, China, North Korea and Iran to proliferate advanced weapons technology, including missiles, drones and chemical and biological weapons, are ushering in a “dangerous new era.” “Unlike our adversaries, we are not developing radioactive nuclear cruise missiles or orbital nuclear weapons, which would be a clear violation of the Outer Space Treaty,” he said, referring to Russia, which is reportedly developing both.
Ideally, more assertive U.S. diplomacy might bring China to the table for a tripartite arms talks with Russia and the U.S., but the prospects are dim, as Beijing ignored a U.S. overture to China on managing strategic risks last year. The Cold War arms race began to end when President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev found the political will to reduce arms. Gorbachev was desperate to ease the burden of the arms race on his faltering Communist system, and Reagan had long harbored ambitions to eliminate nuclear weapons altogether. But Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin show no such flexibility or pragmatism. Rather, their pursuit of a new arms race reflects a desire for greater geopolitical struggle.
Vadi’s warning is deeply troubling. A verifiable, binding treaty to limit nuclear weapons would be far preferable. But diplomacy requires two people, or in this case, three, working together.
