Philippine President Ferdinand Bongbong Marcos Jr. drew a line in the sand during his keynote speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on Friday, saying a confrontation between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea that resulted in the deaths of Filipinos would be “very close to an act of war.” Responding to an audience question about mutual defense between the United States and the Philippines, the president said such an event would “have crossed the Rubicon.”
Philippine President Ferdinand Bongbong Marcos Jr. drew a line in the sand during his keynote speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on Friday, saying a confrontation between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea that resulted in the deaths of Filipinos would be “very close to an act of war.” Responding to an audience question about mutual defense between the United States and the Philippines, the president said such an event would “have crossed the Rubicon.”
A senior U.S. military official issued a similar warning in March. These remarks underscore how the gradual escalation of disputes in the South China Sea could veer into a military crisis if current trends continue. Washington’s actions aimed at strengthening deterrence in the region have not succeeded in changing Beijing’s calculations. And while Manila has used its power to back up its legitimate maritime claims, it is nonetheless emboldened in ways that lack a clear strategy and increase risk.
It is not an exaggeration to expect a serious military crisis in the South China Sea. There have been frequent reports of incidents involving Chinese coercive behavior, such as clashes, use of water cannons and military lasers, and swarming, which has even resulted in injuries to Philippine Navy personnel. China has also been increasingly assertive in legislation. A recent order provides for the detention of anyone suspected of crossing into Beijing’s territorial claims in the South China Sea, which could be a harbinger of dangerous incidents in the coming months.
Manila has also shown no signs of backing down from its forays into Second Thomas Shoal and Scarborough Shoal, two major flashpoints in the South China Sea. The US has firmly supported the Philippines, sending a message by doubling down on its “firm commitment” to its allies. When it comes to confronting Beijing, Manila appears to be pushing at Washington’s open door. The increasing entry of other US allies into the region, including Australia, France and Japan, is also a worrying development.
The official positions of the Philippines, China and the United States in the South China Sea are well established. As Foreign Secretary Marcos asserted at Shangri-La, the Philippines cites its sovereignty and international law, and cites a 2016 ruling from the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague that ruled overwhelmingly in its favor. China speaks of sovereignty and maritime interests. The United States cites Chinese coercion and threats to freedom of navigation.
But digging deeper reveals other factors at play, many of which are contributing to rising tensions in the region.
For the United States, the challenge seems to be not only China’s intrusive behavior in the region, but also Beijing’s rise. Though Washington may rarely say it, China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea cannot be entirely separated from anxiety about the country’s relative decline. Over the past decade or so, the United States has lost its primacy in Asia, economically, and perhaps militarily too. But it is not easy to unlearn the habit of primacy, where China’s gain is America’s loss and vice versa.
China’s continued harassment of Philippine ships has led to Manila’s tougher stance. But Philippine foreign policy has historically been driven by personalities, and Marcos’s hold on power was crucial. Quite early in his term, he completely broke with former President Rodrigo Duterte and leaned closer to the United States. There is consensus within the Philippines that the Philippines claims sovereignty over an area known as the West Philippine Sea, and the PCA ruling legitimized this claim under international law.
Although China has never recognised the PCA process and rejected the 2016 ruling, it maintains that the South China Sea claims are historical and therefore legitimate. These claims certainly predate the Communist Party of China, which is why Taiwan also makes the same claims. Beijing strengthened these claims by promoting the construction and militarisation of artificial islands in 2014, soon after President Xi Jinping came to power and began to preach his own version of Chinese nationalism. China’s military confrontation with the Philippines in 2012 and the Philippines’ recourse to the PCA in January 2013 to internationalise the dispute also boosted China’s maritime claims.
China may want to become an Asian hegemon, but it is far from achieving such a goal. Its most immediate concern is the impact of the US-Philippines alliance on a Taiwan conflict. China suspects that newly established US military bases in the Philippines are intended to be used in such a conflict. In general, Beijing often portrays Manila as a pawn in Washington’s strategy to contain China, and tends to downplay Philippine concerns about Chinese assertiveness.
The U.S. presence in the Philippines is expanding. Last year, the number of U.S. military bases in the Philippines increased to nine, up from the five originally provided for in the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. Three of the new bases are in northern Luzon, near Taiwan, and one is located within a naval base, a first under the agreement. The U.S. is also helping build a port on the Batanes Islands in northern Luzon, even closer to Taiwan. Meanwhile, the Philippines has begun joint military patrols with the U.S. and Australia, and signed a trilateral agreement with the U.S. and Japan that has a military dimension.
The US ambassador to China has publicly supported the Philippines’ claim to Scarborough Shoal, saying China ” [legal] Washington has not “clearly” presented the “foundations” for its claim. This goes further than the 2016 PCA ruling, which was limited to the exclusive economic zone aspect of the dispute and did not rule on the territorial claims. Washington has overstepped international law by taking sides in an unresolved territorial dispute.
In summary, there are many risky actions from all sides regarding the South China Sea. According to the logic of deterrence, any concession or retreat will appease the aggressor and increase the chances of war. If military-to-military communication is maintained between rivals, increasing military assets and activities will strengthen peace. But the deterrence model is not the only one. Another spiral model, born from a famous security dilemma in international relations, assumes that any action to strengthen deterrence, even if well-intentioned, will be perceived as a threat by the other side and may result in a similar countermeasure.
How much deterrence would be needed to achieve stability in the South China Sea? There is already a large U.S. military presence in the region, with more than 200 U.S. military bases and facilities on allied territory, not to mention facilities in the U.S. Pacific region. In contrast, China may only have one overseas base in Asia. In any case, the trends of the past two years seem more consistent with the predictions of the spiral model. Strengthening deterrence will only intensify Beijing’s own behavior.
Vietnam’s example may suggest a different future for the Philippines. Analysts Hoang Thi Ha and Aries A. Argay contrast Vietnam’s pragmatic approach to its disputes with China in the South China Sea with the Philippines’ more aggressive, up-front approach under Marcos. Vietnam has not given up its maritime claims. In fact, Hanoi has been much more aggressive than Manila when it comes to reclamation and construction, and it is also cultivating a maritime militia second only to China’s.
But Vietnam’s fundamental stance on non-aligned foreign policy remains unchanged. Last year, Vietnam opened its ports to U.S. naval vessels and hosted U.S. President Joe Biden, while also deepening ties with Beijing. Vietnam has avoided suing China in international courts. All of this has helped to quell China’s fears of U.S. encirclement and keep maritime disputes at a manageable level.
At the same time, Vietnam’s careful alignment with countries such as Japan and domestic balancing sends a defiant message to Beijing. Ironically, Vietnam’s lack of strong treaty allies may be playing a stabilizing role in a difficult conflict.
As America’s oldest ally in Asia, the Philippines has no choice but to embrace non-alignment, nor does it want to. But the current passive approach of sailing ships significantly inferior to China-dominated terrain does not seem like a strategy with achievable goals and the resources to match.
Perhaps it is time for the U.S.-Philippines alliance to try an approach other than adding forces, bases, and allies to tense theaters of war, particularly actions that could incite China’s worst fears about Taiwan. But for this to work, Beijing needs to properly consider the strategic costs to its reputation in Southeast Asia of its heavy-handed tactics over a single point at sea.
Mutual restraint can help calm the raging waters of the South China Sea and leave it to future leaders to resolve territorial disputes.
