The U.S. Indo-Pacific Command also expressed concern that the restrictions could “increase regional tensions, undermine the sovereignty of coastal states, and impede freedom of the high seas.”
However, maritime observers expect Beijing to show some restraint in aggressively enforcing the guidelines.
“The guidelines could become a legal tool, but whether they are implemented will depend on political, not legal, factors.”
Zheng Zhihua, a research associate professor specializing in maritime issues at Shanghai Jiao Tong University, echoed Ko’s views.
“Beijing could apply its domestic laws in these disputed areas, but doing so could trigger diplomatic issues and lead to a deterioration in bilateral relations,” he said.
“Therefore, we do not expect China to enthusiastically apply the newly adopted guidelines in disputed areas.”
Koh said strict implementation of the guidelines would likely result in Southeast Asian fishermen being detained within their countries’ exclusive economic zones, working against Beijing’s interests.
The Philippines could follow its “proactive transparency” strategy by publicizing these cases and taking legal action against China, he said, and such detention could encourage other Southeast Asian countries to unite in the face of Chinese actions.
He also referred to Article 11 of the guidelines, which states that China’s Coast Guard has jurisdiction over administrative cases in “maritime areas under China’s jurisdiction.”
Koh said this was vaguely worded in terms of geographical application, adding that aggressive enforcement of the new coast guard rules “could be used as a lever to increase extra-regional presence in the South China Sea dispute.”
This is because frequent enforcement could “amplify threats from China” and be “harmful to China’s interests.”
Beijing has always resisted outside involvement in the decades-old South China Sea dispute, where China claims almost all of the area below what it calls its historic “nine-dash line.”
The commission argues that such intervention increases tensions and hinders resolution efforts, and it advocates direct negotiations between claimant states and a regional dialogue to address complex maritime sovereignty issues.
The pact is seen as strengthening the Philippines’ negotiating position after it signed a Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) with the United States in 1951 to counter an increasingly assertive Chinese stance in the vast, resource-rich and economically and strategically important seaway.
Washington has repeatedly asserted its commitment to the MDT, with senior officials declaring that any armed attack on Philippine military, public vessels or aircraft, including the coast guard, in the South China Sea would trigger mutual defense obligations.
As a result, Coe said any Coast Guard enforcement around the disputed Second Thomas Shoal was unlikely. Renai Jao The Chinese version said the Philippine outpost was a stranded naval vessel and “potentially could trigger the MDT trigger.”
Known as Huangyan Island in China and Panatag Shoal in the Philippines, the chain of rocks lies about 220 kilometres west of the Philippine island of Luzon and has been under Beijing’s control since a 2012 standoff with Manila.
The Philippines sought international arbitration over the dispute, and a court in The Hague ruled in its favor in 2016.
China rejects the ruling but says a “tentative special agreement signed with the Chinese side in 2016” allows small Philippine fishing boats to operate around “specific waters” around Scarborough Shoal and keeps warships, police vessels and public vessels away from the Shoal’s 12 nautical miles (22 kilometers) territorial waters and airspace.
But amid the ongoing maritime standoff in the area, the Chinese Embassy said last month that “the current Philippine government has unilaterally destroyed this agreement” and “crossed a red line over the Scarborough Shoal issue.”
A month ago, Philippine civilians visited Scarborough Shoal in a show of defiance against Manila’s claims, coinciding with the release of China’s new coast guard guidelines.
Zheng said the possibility of Beijing implementing the guidelines could not be ruled out if a similar mission were to take place again.
“In Beijing’s eyes, without prior provocation from the Philippines and other relevant countries, it will not easily apply these restrictions in disputed areas as it could appear that Beijing is behaving irrationally.”
“But if their actions are provocative and unacceptable from Beijing’s perspective, China may feel the need to demonstrate strength,” Zheng said.
Ko said Beijing faces a “tough tightrope walk” in implementing the guidelines.
“If there are instances where Beijing needs to invoke the guidelines but doesn’t, it will undermine its credibility and make it look like a paper tiger. [the rules] If we act aggressively, we will bring about unwanted or undesirable consequences.”