PUBLISHED
August 10, 2025
In the 1960s, at the height of the Cold War, the world watched as the United States and the Soviet Union competed in the ‘space race.’ As both hurled rockets, satellites, and spacecraft into the upper atmosphere, each launch showcased more than technological prowess. The race to the moon became a test of geopolitical will, a symbol of which superpower would define the future. When Neil Armstrong planted the American flag on the lunar surface, the ‘giant leap’ he reflected on was not just for humanity, but a step that cemented the technology-powered hegemony the United States would enjoy for decades.
Today, against the backdrop of another great-power rivalry, a similar contest is unfolding. The stage this time is not just the vacuum of space, but the invisible architecture of algorithms and the chips that power them. Artificial intelligence is the new frontier, and once again, two superpowers are vying for dominance. But unlike the space race, this competition is not bound by the heavens. It reaches into every industry, every household, and every corner of human life. The stakes are no longer whose flag hangs on the moon but who controls the digital nervous system of the planet.
AI is no longer a distant promise. It is here, transforming economies, redefining power, and reshaping societies. Yet as the technology accelerates, so too does the contest over who sets its rules and who benefits from its capabilities. At the heart of this struggle stand two competing visions — one put forward by the United States, the other by China — that reveal not only differing strategic priorities but also fundamentally divergent philosophies on how the next world order is to be structured.
Last month, the White House released America’s AI Action Plan, a document that frames AI development as a high-stakes race in which “whoever has the largest AI ecosystem will set global AI standards and reap broad economic and military benefits.” The language is blunt: the US must “achieve and maintain unquestioned and unchallenged global technological dominance.” This is not simply about innovation; it is about securing and entrenching American power.
To that end, the American plan rests on three pillars: accelerating AI innovation, building American AI infrastructure and leading in international AI diplomacy and security, with the last pillar designed explicitly to “counter Chinese influence in international governance bodies.” The plan promotes an ‘AI alliance’ composed of the US and select partners, to which Washington will export its full AI technology stack: hardware, models, software, applications and standards. Crucially, this comes with a defensive edge: stringent export controls to prevent “foreign adversaries” from accessing advanced computing, enhanced location-verification of chips and coordinated global enforcement to keep high-end AI resources out of the hands of rivals.
In other words, Washington’s AI diplomacy is about building a gated community, one in which entry is granted on US terms. The US openly links this to national security, implying that AI superiority must be preserved not as a shared global asset but as a strategic advantage for America and its allies.
Beijing, by contrast, has spent the past two years articulating a vision for AI governance that is overtly multilateral and inclusive, with an emphasis on participation from the Global South. Premier Li Qiang, speaking at the 2025 World Artificial Intelligence Conference (WAIC) held in Shanghai from July 26 to 28, called AI “an international public good that benefits humanity.” He stressed that “only by working together can we fully realise the potential of AI while ensuring its safe, reliable, controllable, and equitable development.”
Li underscored the urgency of creating a truly global framework for governance, stating, “there is an urgent need to foster further consensus on how to strike a balance between development and security.” He warned that without broad cooperation, AI risks becoming “an exclusive game for a few countries and companies.”
China’s Action Plan on Global Governance of Artificial Intelligence frames AI as a tool for “serving the people, respecting sovereignty, fairness and inclusiveness, and open cooperation.” The plan advocates reducing technical barriers, promoting technology transfer, and developing open-source communities to foster a diverse and accessible innovation ecosystem. It goes further by explicitly committing to support “countries, especially those in the Global South” in building their AI capabilities in line with their own national conditions.
The most concrete manifestation of this philosophy is China’s proposal for a global AI cooperation organisation. The body would aim to align governance rules, technical standards, and development strategies, while respecting policy differences between nations. Beijing presents this not as an ideological bloc but as a pragmatic platform: a means for countries to undertake joint technical research, share open-source technologies, and strengthen their own AI innovation ecosystems.
As Li explained, “China is willing to share its AI development experience and technological products to help countries around the world — especially those in the Global South — to strengthen their capacity building.” He further proposed “greater cooperation on innovation to achieve more groundbreaking results,” pledging that China “will be more open in sharing open-source technology and products.”
The Global South is central to this vision. Chinese officials position the cooperation body as a way to bridge the “digital and intelligence divide,” ensuring developing nations benefit equally from AI’s economic and social potential. For countries outside the US orbit, many already drawn into China’s Belt and Road networks, this is an attractive proposition: access to AI technologies, capacity-building support and a seat at the governance table without having to choose sides in a zero-sum competition.
This is not to say China’s approach is entirely altruistic. Extending AI cooperation deepens Beijing’s global influence, especially in regions where Western technology and capital have been limited or conditional. By positioning itself as the champion of multilateralism, China counters the US narrative that it should be isolated from key technological flows. In effect, China’s inclusive rhetoric also functions as strategic outreach to counter Washington’s exclusionary alliance-building.
Still, the differences in tone and substance between the two plans are striking. The US blueprint treats AI as a high ground to be seized and defended. The Chinese plan treats it as a commons to be cultivated.
These divergent philosophies carry profound implications for the structure of the emerging AI order. If Washington’s approach prevails, the world could see the consolidation of closed technology blocs: one led by the US and populated by its security partners, another orbiting around China and those willing to defy American export controls. Innovation might accelerate within each bloc, but the gaps between them — in capabilities, standards, and access — would widen. The very idea of global governance would fragment into parallel systems, mirroring Cold War-era divides.
If Beijing’s approach gains traction, there could be greater cross-border sharing of AI resources, especially between advanced economies and the developing world. This could help narrow the AI divide and create more interoperable global standards, though it would also require trust in China’s commitment to openness and in its own governance norms. Given that China’s domestic AI environment is subject to extensive state oversight and censorship, some countries may remain cautious about whether its version of “openness” aligns with their values.
For the Global South, the stakes are especially high. Under the US plan, access to cutting-edge AI may be contingent on political alignment, limiting the ability of non-aligned nations to leverage AI for their own development. Under the Chinese plan, access might be easier, but the terms could be shaped by Beijing’s strategic priorities and its own vision for digital sovereignty.
The choice facing much of the world, then, is not simply between ‘free’ and ‘restricted’ AI, but between different models of technological interdependence: one based on selective exclusivity, the other on conditional inclusivity. Both are political, both are strategic and both will shape how AI transforms the global economy.
