Most states are spying. In principle, there is nothing to stop them. But China’s requests for information from the rest of the world go far beyond what Western intelligence agencies typically collect. It includes vast amounts of commercial data and intellectual property, and has been described by Keith Alexander, the former head of the US National Security Agency, as “the largest transfer of wealth in history.” In addition to collecting data from government websites, parliamentarians, universities, think tanks, and human rights organizations, China also targets diaspora groups and individuals.
A Chinese cyber intrusion targeted British MPs and stole population-level data from the UK Electoral Commission database. Meanwhile, in the United States, Congress recently cracked down on Chinese-owned TikTok, admitting that some of its employees had spied on American journalists.
Three Germans were arrested on Monday on charges of attempting to transfer military information and obtaining special lasers sent to Beijing without authorization. On the same day, two British nationals, including a Conservative parliamentary aide, were charged with violating the Official Secrets Act for allegedly passing “adverse information” to China.
Xi Jinping speaks as if China is at war – On this week’s National Security Education Day, Xi Jinping said all citizens must be on guard for signs of espionage. “Foreign spies are everywhere,” said the public broadcaster of China’s powerful civilian spy agency, the Ministry of State Security (MSS). “They can disguise themselves as anyone.”
The MSS is responsible for internal security, counterespionage, and foreign intelligence gathering. Although officially a state institution and not part of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), its primary mission is to protect against threats to the regime. An important criterion for employment is an oath of absolute loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party.
Like many Chinese institutions, the structure of the MSS headquarters is replicated at the provincial and city level, with regional offshoots responsible for the bulk of foreign intelligence gathering, and historically, geographically and commercially It monitors countries with which it has connections. The Shanghai National Security Bureau primarily targets the United States. The Zhejiang office focuses on Western Europe, including the UK. The Tianjin bureau covers Japan and South Korea. and Guangdong Province Southeast Asia Bureau.
The data collected serves various purposes. For example, stolen medical data is used for biomedical research. This will almost certainly include pharmaceuticals as well as biological warfare programs. Large amounts of overseas data are used to train Chinese AI’s large-scale language models.
The Chinese Communist Party also employs private cyber companies to supplement its activities. The UK’s Electoral Commission has been hacked by Wuhan-based cyber company Xiaoruizhi Science and Technology. A leak a few weeks ago revealed that the Shanghai-based company I-Soon employs hackers for various missions carried out on behalf of the Chinese government. From 95 gigabytes of Indian immigration data to Vietnamese airline passenger records, the scope and ambition was astonishing. Other targets included NATO, the British Foreign Office and the think tank Chatham House.
Of course, China has been spying on an industrial scale for years. When President Xi Jinping visited Washington, D.C., a decade ago, President Barack Obama publicly called for an end to spying. Instead, the country has deepened its cyber capabilities while building on old-fashioned human intelligence. In the past, Chinese intelligence services tended to rely almost exclusively on Chinese agents from the 60 million-strong diaspora community around the world. One of them was Chi Mak, a naturalized American working in the US defense sector, who was sentenced to 24 years in prison for trying to give China details of a radar system used to protect warships.
However, China is now concerned that the diaspora includes anti-Chinese Communist Party activists and dissidents. So another big part of Chinese intelligence’s job is to monitor (and, if necessary, enforce silence on) overseas Chinese people who are critical of the Chinese Communist Party. This coercion usually takes the form of pressure on relatives back home, but Chinese intelligence services and their agents (criminal groups and local private investigators) often take more direct action to silence critics. There is also.
There is also Operation Fox Hunt, a secret global operation to hunt down Chinese officials suspected of corruption who have fled to other countries. A report released this month found that over 10 years, 12,000 people had been found in so-called “fugitive recovery operations” in 120 countries. The Chinese government has set aside large sums of money for a global investigation and has hired private investigators.Former New York police officer Michael McMahon was charged last year with “interstate stalking” and “illegal agent of China.” [People’s Republic of China]’. One of the targets had a note inserted into his door that read, “If you’re willing to go back to the mainland and spend 10 years in prison, your wife and children will be fine.” This is the end of this matter! ”
Another part of China’s global law enforcement network are secret “police stations” established in more than 50 countries, mostly liberal democracies. These are serious violations of diplomatic norms and are often illegal. Officials claim that these organizations exist to help Chinese people navigate various bureaucratic procedures. But is that the purpose of a regular Chinese consulate? In reality, these “police stations” exist primarily to monitor and suppress dissident activities.
Most Chinese embassies have MSS stations, but they are usually not declared to the host government. A defense attaché office with intelligence-gathering authority will also be established. These are supplemented by police officers under journalistic and commercial cover. However, most of the agent’s recruitment efforts take place within China, allowing the intelligence services to take full advantage of the nation’s capabilities, including state-owned enterprises, universities, think tanks, and various party and political parties in charge of development. It can adopt the identity of a national organization. and maintain contact with the outside world.
Chinese intelligence agencies have previously been cautious about recruiting foreigners and using techniques such as honey traps. There seem to be fewer restrictions now. Nor is their effort clearly limited to those who have access to the information. There is growing evidence that international students are being approached within China in the hope of eventually placing them in positions of influence in their home countries. This is the holy grail for any intelligence agency. In most cases, the target is approached by someone with a seemingly innocuous background and receives an offer of money in exchange for something completely uncontroversial. Over time, this evolves into requests for more sensitive information.
A similar approach has been taken with targets outside of China, where they are initially contacted through social media sites such as LinkedIn and (usually) paid to attend academic conferences or similar events. You will be asked to visit. Take former CIA employee Kevin Mallory, for example. Heavily in debt, behind on his mortgage and unemployed, he accepted an invitation to his LinkedIn from someone posing as a Beijing-based headhunter. Although he did not write that he was ex-CIA, his resume left little doubt to those who knew what to look for. He was given what appeared to be a secure telephone-based communications system to report information gleaned from his former colleagues to case officers. He was then arrested and sentenced to 20 years in prison.
China’s intelligence agencies are well-funded, and payments to intelligence services can be shockingly high. The downside is that if you get caught, you’ll be left to fend for yourself. Chinese intelligence services will not provide any assistance or attempt to secure your release. Ji Mak was left to die in prison. The same is likely to be true of Xu Yanjun, a Jiangsu State Security Bureau official who was arrested in Belgium after visiting American agents in the aerospace field. It was a set-up. He was arrested, extradited to the United States, and sentenced to 20 years in prison. “This is just the latest example of the Chinese government’s continued attacks on the economic security of the United States,” the FBI said.
It would be a mistake to think of the MSS as China’s KGB or MI6, a single intelligence agency with a spy chief. Espionage is a routine part of Chinese bureaucratic life and is embedded in a variety of institutions. The Chinese Communist Party is a Leninist organization, forged in a secret crucible that remains the center of its culture. There are various departments within the Chinese Communist Party, from propaganda to international liaison, all of which pursue strategic goals. They all use a variety of techniques, ranging from completely overt to completely covert.
From China’s perspective, they are simply doing what British and American intelligence agencies have been doing for years. Neither makes any secret of the fact that they collect information about China for national security and profit reasons. And while Western intelligence agencies are not actively trying to overthrow the Chinese Communist Party (although the previous Trump administration came close), China believes that the activities of Western media and pressure groups have subversive intent. Yes, we recognize that we have at least some degree of consent from the government.
The scope and intensity of Chinese espionage has overwhelmed Western defense capabilities. The FBI also acknowledges this. And if this is true for the FBI, should it be even more so for smaller agencies like Belgium’s Soulete, which are facing a tsunami of Chinese intelligence? Additionally, Western intelligence agencies are severely lacking in relevant language skills and local expertise. During the Cold War, there were many Russian speakers and experts on Soviet culture in the West. In comparison, there is very little knowledge or understanding about China.
This is not (yet) another Cold War. It is important to discuss the nature of the challenges posed by China without creating an atmosphere of latter-day McCarthyism or suggesting that all Chinese people should be treated with distrust. The Chinese government said China is not an enemy but a “strategic challenge.” Addressing this challenge will need to become an essential part of Western political thought in the near future. I’m sure we can improve it even more.